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Dead Or Revived? An Examination Of
California Revivor Law's Terminal Void
In The Corporate Existence
Arthur F. Coon
INTRODUCTION
California statutes have long provided for the suspension and
revivor of the corporate powers of tax delinquent corporations.'
Generally, the corporate rights, powers and privileges of a domestic
corporate taxpayer are suspended, and those of a foreign corporate
taxpayer forfeited, for nonpayment of franchise and other taxes.'
A corporation may gain relief from suspension by paying back
taxes with penalties and interest.' Such reinstatement or "revivor"
is, however, with certain exceptions with respect to contracts
entered into during suspension,4 "without prejudice to any action,
defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original
suspension or forfeiture." 5 By statute, certain corporate contracts,
* A.B. 1982, University of Southern California; J.D. 1986, School of Law, University of
California, Davis; Law Clerk to Chief Justice Malcolm M. Lucas of the California Supreme Court,
1986-87.
1. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23301 (West 1992) (suspension); id. §§ 23305, 23305a,
23305b, 23305c, 23305d (West 1992) (revivor). For information and analysis regarding the operation
of suspension and revivor statutes in California and elsewhere, see generally W i~m MEADE
FLrHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF TE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATONS § 7998, at 94-107 (Revised Vol.
1988); John P. Ludington, Annotation, Reinstatement of Repealed, Forfeited Expired or Suspended
Corporate Charter as Validating Interim Acts of Corporation, 42 A.L.R. 4th 392 (1985) [hereinafter
Corporate Charter Reinstatement].
2. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE §§ 23301-23301.5 (West 1992) (suspending corporate
powers for failure to file return); Damato v. Slevin, 214 Cal. App. 3d 668, 671, 262 Cal. Rptr. 879,
880 (1989) (discussing consequences of failure to file return).
3. CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 23305 (West 1992).
4. Id. §§ 23305a, 23304.1,23304.5,23305.1 (West 1992).
5. Id. § 23305a (West 1992); Damato, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 671,674,262 Cal. Rptr. at 880,
882. As shall appear, a fundamental judicial misunderstanding of the legislative history of this key
language has created serious problems in the development of the law. See infra notes 40-44 and
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including those made during suspension, are voidable by the other
party to the contract (through rescission with full payment of
restitution) if not "cured" by obtaining statutory relief from
voidability.6 Aside from the provisions concerning contracts,
California's suspension and revivor statutes provide unclear
guidance about what corporate actions taken during suspension are
retroactively validated by revivor.7
The lack of clear guidance regarding when non-contractual
interim acts will be retroactively validated by revivor has generated
extensive litigation. The result has been a logically inconsistent
body of case law lacking (1) practical guiding principles,8  (2)
employs outmoded legal concepts and crude as well as unhelpful
analogies,9 and (3) relies heavily on prevailing judicial perceptions
accompanying text.
6. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 23305a, 23304.1,23304.5,23305.1 (West 1992). See infra
note 43 (discussing rules applicable to voiding corporate contracts made during suspension).
7. The 1991 legislative amendments to the statutes (see 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 1082, at
4366-4572 (West)), while undoubtedly well intentioned, only compound the confusion because they
fail to address the problem of retroactive validation in other than a piecemeal manner. After 1990
amendments (see 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv., ch. 926, at 3457-3463 (West)), for example, the statutes
stated that, without limitation, the consequences of tax suspension included that "the taxpayer shall
not be entitled to sell, transfer, or exchange real property in California .... " CAL REV. & TAX.
CODE § 23302(d) (West 1992). The 1991 amendments to section 23305.1, governing relief from
contract voidability, expressly provided retroactive validation for unrescinded sales, transfers or
exchanges upon relief, stating such transfers "shall be valid as if the taxpayer had not been subject
to [the suspension] at the time of the sale, transfer, or exchange." Id. § 23305.1()(1)(B) (West
1992). This step in the right direction was counterbalanced by another amendment implying that
revivor is not retroactive in effect by injecting the new concept of "restoration" where the Franchise
Tax Board ("FfB") has acted in error in suspending a corporation. In such cases, the statute
provides the FEB "shall, in connection with the revivor, indicate that the taxpayer is 'restored.' The
status of the restored taxpayer shall be retroactive to the date of suspension or forfeiture as if there
has been no suspension or forfeiture." Id. § 23305(c) (West 1992). Since this provision deals with
relief from contractual voidability rather than the general effect of revivor, it raises the issue whether
transfers not part of any contract (such as gifts) would be retroactively validated.
Corporate acts undertaken in the interim between suspension and revivor will be referred to
herein at times as "interim acts," a useful shorthand phrase borrowed from the Corporate Charter
Reinstatement annotation, supra note 1.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 37-115, 328-39 (addressing the development of and
logical flaws in this inconsistent body of case law).
9. Courts have variously characterized a suspended corporation as "dead," "defunct," or
"a corpse." See Damato, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 673, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 882 (citing Van Landingham
v. United Tuna Packers, 189 Cal. 353, 370, 208 P. 973, 979 (1922). Courts have also characterized
such corporations as being in a state of "suspended animation." See Ransome-Crummey Co. v.
Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 397, 205 P. 446,448 (1922). More modernly, courts have referred to
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of the basic purposes of the tax collection statutes ° and the
prevailing "judicial attitude" toward suspended corporations.1
Under California case law, fully revived corporations that operated
during suspension are plagued with uncertainty about the validity
of numerous types of interim acts. Wasteful litigation by
opportunistic third parties challenging virtually every such
"offending" interim act is thus encouraged.'
2
While the holdings of the reported California decisions usually
validate the challenged interim acts and thus confirm the broad
curative powers of revivor, 13 their rationales for doing so are
inconsistent, poorly-reasoned, ignore relevant legislative history,
and perpetuate the use of unhelpful concepts, analogies, and
principles.' 4 As a result, the law has no predictive value, and
a suspended corporation as "an unconscious person [capable of being] revived by artificial
respiration." See Diverco Constructors, Inc. v. Wilsten, 4 Cal. App. 3d 6, 12, 85 Cal. Rptr. 851, 855
(1970). It would seem more accurate and helpful to recognize that a suspended corporation
performing interim acts is a de facto corporation lacking legal capacity. Such a corporation's actions
are not void, but, as a matter of public policy, are not legally authorized. A suspended corporation's
acts will not be recognized by the courts to confer any rights on the corporation until the acts are
retroactively validated by revivor, which restores legal capacity. This analysis is very similar to the
familiar doctrine of estoppel. It could well be said that a suspended corporation is estopped from
asserting the validity of its interim acts until it regains through revivor its full legal status and
capacity. See infra text accompanying notes 345-46 (suggesting estoppel analysis).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46.
11. See Damato, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 881 (noting the "harsh attitude"
of the Ransome-Crummey era, which viewed delinquent corporate taxpayers as "pariahs," has
changed and that "the present judicial attitude is positively benign.").
12. Under present law, virtually all of a revived corporation's myriad types of interim acts are
subject to at least a tenable legal challenge. As correctly noted by the high court of one of
California's sister states:
The powers of a corporation are many-the power to sue and to be sued, the power to
deed real estate; the power to carry on a business, et cetera. Furthermore, corporate
activity consists of a flow of many acts, some beginning, some ending, and some in
process at a given instant A corporation hires, fires, manufactures, trades, sells, and
engages in corporate activities until such time as the suspension is invoked.
Industrial Coordinators, Inc. v. Artco, Inc., 115 N.W. 2d 123, 124 (Mich. 1962).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 76-104 (discussing the various rationales employed by
the courts to recognize the restorative effect of revivor).
14. California courts use three basic rationales to validate interim acts: (1) The challenge based
on suspension is a disfavored "plea in abatement" which becomes an invalid objection if the
corporation is revived before the hearing on the plea; (2) the revivor operates retroactively to validate
merely "procedural" interim acts (while not curing "substantive" ones); and (3) suspension causes
a corporate "incapacity" which only affects the corporation's power to proceed in a judicial forum,
and not, for example, its ability to obtain and benefit from administrative decisions of bodies
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encourages unnecessary litigation. Reform aimed at providing a
measure of certainty is needed.
This Article (1) explores the development and status of the law
concerning revivor's effect on the validity of interim acts in
California (and, to a lesser extent, in other states), (2) criticizes the
approach California courts have taken in this area, and (3)
recommends legislation expressly providing that revivor
retroactively validates all interim acts.15 A rule of retroactively-
validating revivor would be desirable for several reasons. First,
such a rule is consistent with the legislative history and prevailing
judicial holdings in California. Second, retroactive validation is the
majority and better view of the matter on a national scale. Finally,
validation of all interim acts comports with basic fairness and the
essentially non-punitive nature of the relevant tax collection
statues.
1 6
Part I of the Article uses four brief hypotheticals to illustrate
"real life" contexts in which serious suspension and revivor
problems may arise.17 It then explores the development and
present state of California case law.1" It reveals an early judicial
misreading of legislative intent, followed by a nearly complete
turnabout in the California Supreme Court's views on the purpose
and effect of the relevant statutes within a fifty-year period and
without the overruling of a single precedent or the enactment of a
significantly different statute.19 It examines the Supreme Court's
empowered to act sue sponte (i.e., without need of parties with full capacity to invoke
"jurisdiction"). Each of these rationales is logically inconsistent with the others and each is discussed
in greater detail later in this Article. See infra notes 118-33, 328-39 and accompanying text.
15. This excepts, of course, interim acts of contracting, an obvious area of special legislative
concern which is already the subject of detailed statutory treatment. See supra notes 5-6 (citing
sections of the California Revenue and Taxation code which apply to interim acts of contracting);
see also infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing the voidability of contracts entered into
during period of suspension).
16. See infra notes 37-348 and accompanying text
17. See infra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 37-176 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 37-115 and accompanying text (tracing development of California Supreme
Court's current position, as expressed in Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal.
3d 369,503 P.2d 285, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1972), that revivor should operate broadly because purpose
of suspension is not to punish, back through its contrary former doctrine that interim acts were void
as part of the suspension penalty, as stated in Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal.
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unsatisfactory plea in abatement and substantive-versus-procedural
act rationales, and also discusses the well-settled but logically
inconsistent statute of limitations exception to the general rule
retroactively validating interim acts in the litigation context.2"
Finally, it reviews the few California opinions which address (with
wildly divergent rationales) the effect of corporate suspension and
revivor in the troublesome non-contract, non-litigation context.2"
Part II of the Article examines leading out-of-state authorities
in the corporate suspension and revivor area in search of trends,
helpful insights, and possible solutions to the problems caused by
California's unclear law.'
393,396,205 P. 446,447 (1922)). The Court of Appeal in Damato v. Slevin, 214 Cal. App. 3d 668,
672, 262 Cal. Rptr. 879, 881 (1989), struggled to discern a gradual relaxation of "the Legislature's
hostility" toward suspended corporations by focusing on certain language of supposedly stricter
predecessor suspension statutes in an attempt to partially explain this almost complete reversal in the
law. Damato, 241 Cal. App. 3d at 672 n.8, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 881 n.8. But in reality, the substitution
of "may" for "shall" in the operative statutory language with respect to actual suspension is of little
import in light of the Franchise Tax Board's mandatory duty to effectuate the suspension. See CAL.
R v. & TAX. CODE § 23302 (West 1992). The apparent scope of suspension has actually been
broadened in the modem statutes by the deletion of a suspended corporation's right to defend itself
in court. Compare former 1917 CAL STAT. ch. 214, sec. 26, at 358-361 (enacting CAL PENAL CODE
§ 366910 with CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23301 (West 1992). It would also seem that the former
language specifying that a suspended corporation's powers were "incapable of being exercised for
any purpose or in any manner," while stronger in tone than the word "suspended" standing alone
in the modem statutes, was probably simply deleted as being logically redundant and not intended
to speak at all to the issue of revivor's effect. Moreover, the Legislature has more recently expressly
pointed out in greater detail certain acts suspended corporations are not entitled to perform. See supra
note 7 (discussing specific acts prohibited while a corporation is suspended). But see id. (noting that
recent legislation, as a result of its failure to deal with the problem of retroactive validation in a
comprehensive manner, has only compounded the uncertainty). Nevertheless, the Damato court's
gallant attempt to make some sense of the developing law is admirable. The more likely explanation
of the modem trend lies in the probable recognition by the courts that the seminal doctrine of
Ransome-Crummey was erroneous, poorly reasoned, and not in keeping with the Legislature's
intention either when written or today. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text (discussing the
Ransome-Crummey decision).
20. See infra notes 76-115,134-55,163-73 and accompanying text. As shall appear, the great
majority of the cases not dealing with the effect of revivor on interim contracts (which is addressed
in detail by statute) deal with its effect on steps taken by a corporation in pending litigation. With
the exception of the filing of complaints by a corporation not revived until after expiration of the
statute of limitations, litigation acts are routinely labelled by the courts as procedural, and are held
to be retroactively validated by a revivor.
21. See infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 177-327 and accompanying text.
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Part III of the Article, guided by the earlier analyses,
recommends curative legislation, or at the very least a cogent
judicial interpretation based on the doctrine of estoppel, to address
and eliminate the problems earlier identified.'3 The object of the
suggested legislative reform is to (1) correct, simplify and clarify
the law in this area, (2) to eliminate its useless and confusing
analytical framework, (3) to affirm and strengthen the trend toward
giving revivor a completely retroactive effect as to all interim
corporate acts, and (4) to provide much-needed certainty that would
reduce litigation.
I. ANALYSIS OF CALFORNIA LAW REGARDING
CORPORATE SUSPENSION AND THE RETROACTVE
EFFECT OF A REVIVOR
A. Hypotheticals
The problems created by a revived corporation's inability to
rely on the validity of its interim acts can be quite serious. Far
from being merely matters of academic interest, these problems can
prove financially devastating to the unfortunate corporation. 24 The
following four hypothetical fact patterns illustrate the nature of the
retroactive validity problem in the particularly troublesome area
involving interim acts which do not involve contracting or steps
taken in litigation.
23. See infra notes 328-48 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., Benton v. County of Napa, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485,277 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1991)
[Benton 11] (challenging validity of use permit and related construction permits to build a 450,000-
gallon per year winery on a 856 acre parcel based on corporation's tax suspension during
administrative approval of use permit extension); Benton v. County of Napa, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1467,
1473, 277 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1991) [Benton /] (providing facts regarding extent of project size); Sado
Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 217 Cal. App. 3d 1509, 266 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1990) (loss of revived
corporation's right to continue lawsuit for interference with prospective business advantage and
interference with contractual relations based on running of statute of limitations due to nonpayment
of $90.85 in penalties and interest).
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1. Hypothetical Number One
Assume Corporation A holds mining clains in land situated
in a sparsely-populated northern California county. Unbeknownst
to Corporation A, its corporate powers have been suspended under
Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 for inadvertently26
failing to pay its franchise taxes. During the period of suspension,
Corporation A's employees performed legally-required annual labor
necessary to maintain its mining claims and prevent their relocation
25. See generally CAL PUB. REs. CODE §§ 3900-3924 (West Supp. 1992) (California law
governing the location of mining claims).
26. Despite the Legislature's efforts in recent years to protect the rights of taxpayer, it was
unclear until 1991 whether a corporate taxpayer was entitled to notice before a section 23301
suspension became effective. Section 21020, enacted as part of 1988 legislation now known as the
"Taxpayers' Bill of Rights," provides in pertinent part that-
[A] taxpayer shall not be suspended pursuant to Section 23301, 23301.5, or 23775 unless
the board has mailed a notice preliminary to suspension which indicates that the taxpayer
will be suspended by a date certain pursuant to section 23301, 23301.5, or 23775, as the
case may be. The notice preliminary to suspension shall be mailed to the taxpayer at least
60 days before the date certain.
CAL REv. & TAX. CODE § 21020 (West Supp. 1992). Section 23302, as later revised by 1990
amendments (1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 926, § 5, at 3), however, casted doubt upon this "right" by
providing in pertinent part:
(a) Forfeiture or suspension of a taxpayer's powers, rights and privileges pursuant to
Section 23301, 23301.5, 23571, or 23775 shall occur and become effective only as
expressly provided in this section.
(b) The notice requirements of Section 21020 shall apply to any suspension of a
taxpayer's corporate powers, rights, and privileges pursuant to Section 23571, and to any
forfeiture of a taxpayer's corporate powers, rights, and privileges pursuant to Section
23301, 23301.5, 23571, or 23775.
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 23302(a)-(b) (West 1992) (emphasis added). While subdivision (b) may
have simply been a poorly drafted attempt to augment the notice requirement, former section 23302's
failure to expressly provide, in subdivision (b), that the notice requirements of section 21020 applied
to section 23301 and 23301.5 suspensions could, in light of the emphasized language in subdivision
(a), have been construed to abrogate those rights entirely, a seemingly unintended and unfair result.
Happily, these problems were addressed by 1991 amendments to section 23302, which now provides
that suspension "shall occur and become effective only as expressly provided in this section in
conjunction with section 21020, which requires notice prior to the suspension of a taxpayer's
corporate powers, rights and privileges." Id. § 23302(a) (West 1992). In any event, given the ever-
present potential for bureaucratic errors and the maze-like nature and complexity of the statutory
scheme at issue, it is still not difficult to conceive of corporations commonly-and for totally innocent
reasons-inadvertently failing to pay their taxes.
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by a competitor's labor.' Unfortunately, a claim jumper who has
also worked the mines has discovered the suspension. The claim
jumper contends Corporation A's acts of annual labor were invalid
27. See CAT- PuB. REs. CODE § 3912 (West Supp. 1992) ("The amount of work done on
improvements made during each year to hold possession of a mining claim shall be that prescribed
by the laws of the United States, which is one hundred dollars ($100) annually.") Mining claims
which have lapsed, or been abandoned or forfeited for failure to perform the required annual labor,
may be relocated by another party in the same manner as an original location is required to be made.
Id. § 3903 (West Supp. 1992); cf. Thornton v. Phelan, 65 Cal. App. 480, 484, 224 P. 259, 260
(1924); see Depuy v. Williams, 26 Cal. 309 (1864) (failure to perform legally-required work on
mining claim amounts to abandonment and subjects claim to occupation by another). The Thornton
court affirmed a trial court's judgment for respondent in a quiet title action between competing parties
claiming to have relocated a mining claim abandoned by a corporation (the Santa Ana Mining
Company). Thorton, 65 Cal. App. at 484, 224 P. at 260. The Corporation's rights to do business in
the State of California had previously been forfeited in February 1915 for failure to pay corporation
taxes, as a result of which forfeiture the corporation's directors had become its trustees. Id at 482-83,
224 P. at 260. Appellant claimed to have relocated the claims on January 1, 1917, based on his
contentions that as of that date the claims were subject to relocation because (1) the Santa Ana
Mining Company had abandoned its claims prior to 1916, and (2) that as a factual matter, no required
labor for its use or benefit was performed thereon in 1916. lId
Respondent claimed that required labor was performed for the corporation's benefit in 1916 and
that, as a result, appellant's purported 1917 relocation was invalid and that respondent held title to
the claim as a result of its April 10, 1920 relocation. Id. The court of appeal rejected appellant's
testimonial evidence as insufficient and conclusory on the issue of the corporation's intent to
abandon. Id at 483, 224 P. at 260. While affirming the trial court's judgment for respondent based
on the performance of the 1916 labor "done for the uses and purposes of the Santa Ana Mining
Company," the court avoided squarely addressing the issue whether acts by the corporation itself
following forfeiture would have been invalid:
The court having found that the annual assessment work for the year 1916 was done for
the uses and purposes of the Santa Ana Mining Company, it is immaterial whether the
cost of said work was or was not paid by the Santa Ana Mining Company. This court has
held in the case of Anderson v. Caughey, 3 Cal. App. 22 (1906), that if the work is done
to the amount required by law, the effect thereof would be the same, even though the
labor has been gratuitous.
Id at 485, 224 P. at 261 (emphasis added). Perhaps appellant's failure to better articulate its forfeiture
argument explains the Thornton court's complete failure to analyze how a corporation, which had
forfeited its right to do business, could hold a mining claim or receive the benefit of a third party's
gratuitous annual labor thereon. The trial court's alternative findings "that the [1916] assessment
work had been done by the Santa Aria Mining Company or for its benefit," were supported by the
fact that under the scheme at issue "the directors of said company [upon forfeiture] became the
trustees of said corporation[.]" Id. at 482, 224 P. at 260 (emphasis added). Although some
uncertainty is caused by the Thornton court's failure to focus on the issue of forfeiture's effect on
corporate acts or powers (or even to cite the forfeiture statute involved), it appears that the
corporation's property rights in the mining claims in that case were held in trust for it by its directors
(rather than extinguished) and were subject to the corporation's potential rehabilitation or reviver
effecting a recovery of such rights. See generally Rossi v. Caire, 186 Cal. 544, 547-52, 199 P. 1042,
104446 (1921) (discussing rights and procedures under apparently analogous statutory scheme
concerning corporate license tax forfeiture and rehabilitation).
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and that he has obtained, through his own labor, intervening
ownership rights to the mining claims. Corporation A immediately
pays its back taxes with interest and penalties, and obtains a
certificate of revivor. Nevertheless, the claim jumper insists the acts
of labor performed by the suspended corporation cannot be
retroactively validated, and that the "rights" which "accrued" to
him by reason of the suspension cannot be prejudiced by revivor.
Is he right?
2. Hypothetical Number Two
Suppose Corporation B holds a valuable patent,
trademark,29 or some other intellectual property right which is
being violated or infringed by a competitor. Assume Corporation
B brings suit for infringement or to cancel its competitor's invalid
registration, and that the competitor then discovers Corporation B
was suspended for tax delinquency during a period in which the
appropriation accrued.3" Assuming Corporation B was promptly
and fully revived, is the competitor correct in asserting that the
corporation's temporary suspension resulted in an abandonment
such that he can fully (and perhaps exclusively) use the mark,
patent or other right without legal violation?
28. Generally, patents are governed by federal law. Issuance of a patent gives the patentee and
her heirs or assigns the exclusive right to make, use or sell the patented invention in the United
States, upon payment of fees, for a term of 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
29. See Educational Dev. Corp. v. Economy Co., 562 F.2d 26, 28 (10th Cir. 1977) ("A
trademark is a distinctive mark, symbol or emblem used by a producer or manufacturer to distinguish
his goods from those of others.-). For procedures concerning federal registration of trademarks, see
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1988). Such registration is prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registered mark and its registration, and of the registrant's ownership of and exclusive right to use
the mark in commerce or in connection with the goods or services as specified in the registration.
15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (1991).
30. See, e.g., Stock Pot Restaurant, Inc. v. Stockpot, Inc., 737 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing the Stock Pot case).
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3. Hypothetical Number Three
Assume that Corporation C is a corporate real estate broker
under whom several licensed salesmen are employed. 31
Corporation C's corporate powers are suspended for inadvertent
failure to pay franchise taxes, and during the suspension its
broker's license is renewed and several real estate purchase
contracts are "brokered" by its agents. During the suspension,
Corporation C advertised the relevant properties through its agents,
listed them on the Multiple Listing Service,32 and otherwise acted
as broker. A commission dispute develops between Corporation C
and one of the sellers, and the seller discovers the corporate
suspension. The seller avoids arguing that the commission
agreement is void or voidable under California Revenue and
Taxation Code sections 23304.1 and 23304.5, to avoid giving
Corporation C the chance to cure the contract and collect its
substantial commission. Instead, the seller argues that the contract
is unenforceable against it because Corporation C was not validly
licensed when the contract was made or when the buyer was
produced because of its suspension at the time of license
31. See CAL Bus. & PRop. CODE § 10130 (West 1987). Section 10130 states that it is
unlawful for any person to engage in the business, act in the capacity of, advertise or assume to act
as a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this state without first obtaining a license. d
A corporation is a "person" within the meaning of the broker's licensing law. See Estate of Baldwin,
34 Cal. App. 3d 596, 604, 110 Cal. Rptr. 189, 194 (1973). A real estate agent, or salesman, -is a
natural person who, for a compensation or in expectation of a compensation, is employed by a
licensed real estate broker to do one or more of the acts [specified in provisions of the Real Estate
regulations as defining activities of real estate brokers]." CAL Bus. & PROP. CODE § 10132 (West
1987). "No real estate salesman shall be employed by or accept compensation from any person other
than the broker under whom he is at the time licensed." Id. § 10137 (West 1987); see Grand v.
Griesinger, 160 Cal. App. 2d 397, 405, 325 P.2d. 475, 480 (1958) (real estate salesman cannot
contract in own name or accept compensation other than from broker under whom he is licensed;
entire statutory scheme requires broker to actively conduct his brokerage business and supervise
salesmen).
32. See CAL Cv. CODE § 1087 (West Supp. 1992). Section 1087 provides that "[a] multiple
listing service is a facility of cooperation of agents, operating through an intermediary which does
not itself act as an agent, through which agents establish express or implied legal relationships with
respect to listed properties .... "' 1d
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renewal.33 Although Corporation C hastily becomes revived
through payment of back taxes with interest and penalties, the
seller insists Corporation C is entitled to no commission from its
"unlicensed" brokerage efforts effecting the sale. Who wins?
4. Hypothetical Number Four
Assume Corporation D is a corporate developer planning a
large condominium/golf course project on a tract of desert land it
owns in Southern California. Corporation D faces fierce opposition
from Save Our Rattlesnakes Eternally (SORE), a group of wealthy
neighboring desert dwellers vehemently opposed to the project.
SORE brings a lawsuit attacking the adequacy of the county's
environmental review of the project.' While Corporation D is
busy defending this lawsuit as the real party in interest and
obtaining the necessary development approvals and permits to
proceed with the project, it unknowingly becomes suspended under
California Revenue and Taxation Code section 23301 for
inadvertently failing to pay franchise taxes.
After a full trial, in which SORE has challenged the validity of
all necessary permits and governmental approvals for the project as
issued without an adequate environmental impact report, SORE
33. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10136 (West 1987) (providing that"no person engaged
in the business or acting in the capacity of a real estate broker or a real estate salesman within this
State shall bring or maintain any action in the courts of this State for the collection of compensation
for the performance of any of the acts mentioned in this article without alleging or proving that he
was a duly license real estate broker or real estate salesman at the time the alleged cause of action
arose"); see also Consul Ltd. v. Solide Enter., Inc., 802 F.2d 1143, 1149 (9th Cir. 1986) (neither
unlicensed corporation nor its president could enforce agreement which contemplated corporation to
perform brokerage services).
34. See CA. PuB. REs. CoDE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (California
Environmental Quality Act or CEQA). In general, and "'[w]ith narrow exceptions, CEQA requires
an EIR [Environmental Impact Report] whenever a public agency proposes to approve or to carry out
a project that may have a significant effect on the environment." Laurel Heights Improvement Ass'n
v. Regents of Univ. of California, 47 Cal. 3d 376, 390, 764 P.2d 278, 281, 253 Cal. Rptr. 426, 429-
30 (1988). When the lead public agency proposing to approve or carry out a project properly
determines it will not have such a significant effect on the environment, it need not prepare an EIR,
but may issue a negative declaration to that effect. See CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 21080(c) (West
1986).
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discovers Corporation D's suspension.35 Bringing it to the court's
(and the surprised Corporation's) attention for the first time, SORE
argues that every single permit and approval issued to Corporation
D during the suspension, as well as every step undertaken by
Corporation D during the environmental litigation, is null and void,
and that judgment must issue in favor of its members.
Even though Corporation D hastily pays its back taxes, with all
interest and penalties, and obtains a certificate of revivor, SORE
continues to argue that the damage is done and that the relevant
permits, approvals, and court appearances cannot be retroactively
validated by the revivor. Assuming it is now too late for the
Corporation to reapply for the permits and approvals under local
law, or that new zoning or political conditions preclude them from
being granted anew, the Corporation's entire project and millions
of dollars in development costs are at stake because of its
inadvertent (and now completely remedied) failure to timely pay its
taxes. Assuming the county has complied with CEQA,36 will
Corporation D be able to build its project?
Unfortunately for suspended corporations, there are no clear
answers under California law to the questions posed. Many
substantial rights of revived corporations in good standing and
acting in good faith are imperiled under present law solely as a
result of seemingly insignificant and quickly remedied tax payment
lapses. The issues raised by the hypotheticals above are too serious
35. The scenario and issues posed by this hypothetical are similar, though in a crucial respect
not identical to, those presented in Benton 1, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1467,277 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1991), and
Benton 11, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 277 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1991). See supra note 24 (discussing Benton
I and Benton 11). While Benton 11 (under current California doctrine) recognized retroactive validation
of a winery use permit extension as a "procedural act" without reaching the fundamental question
whether a corporation's incapacity from suspension had any effect outside the judicial arena in the
first instance, it did not purport to decide whether the initial granting of a permit during suspension
would have been retroactively validated as a merely "procedural act." Indeed (and unfortunately),
its reasoning invites further litigation to resolve that particular issue, which is raised by Hypothetical
Number 4.
36. See CAL. PuB. Rs. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986 & Supp. 1992) (California
Environmental Quality Act).
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and important to leave to the muddled and unhelpful existing case
law for resolution. Keeping these hypotheticals in mind, the next
section analyzes the development and present status of California
law concerning revivor's effect on the validity of interim acts.
B. Development and Present State of California Suspension and
Revivor Law
1. Statutory Provisions Governing Suspension and Revivor
As previously noted, California Revenue and Taxation Code
section 23301 provides that, except for the ability to (1) apply for
exempt status or (2) amend articles of incorporation to perfect such
application or change a corporate name, the corporate rights,
powers, and privileges of a domestic taxpayer may be suspended,
and those of a foreign taxpayer forfeited, for nonpayment of
franchise and other taxes.37 The suspension is mandatory in
nature, but not self-executing, since it may become effective only
when the Franchise Tax Board transmits the delinquent
corporation's name to the Secretary of State.33
A corporation can gain relief from suspension by obtaining a
certificate of revivor and paying taxes owed with penalties and
37. See CAL. RLrv. & TAX. CODE § 23301 (West 1992) (except for filing an application for
tax exempt status or amending articles of incorporation to perfect an application or change the
corporate name, the corporate powers of a domestic taxpayer may be suspended, and those of a
foreign taxpayer forfeited, for specified delinquencies in the payment of any tax, penalty or interest);
CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1502, 2117, 2205, 2206 (West 1990) (similar suspension and forfeiture of
corporate rights for failure to file with Secretary of State required annual statements setting forth
general corporate information and designating in-state agent for service); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 23301.5 (West 1992) (similar suspension and forfeiture of corporate rights for failure to file tax
return); id. §§ 23772, 23774, 23775 (West 1992) (similar suspension and forfeiture for tax-exempt
corporations for failure to file required annual information returns or statements).
38. See CAL. Rev. & TAX. CODE §§ 23302(c), 23304.5 (West 1992); Damato v. Slevin, 214
Cal. App. 3d 668,671,262 Cal. Rptr. 879,880 (1989); Mediterranean Export, Inc. v. Superior Court,
119 Cal. App. 3d 605, 615, 174 Cal. Rptr. 169, 175 (1981). As noted above, mailed notice from the
Franchise Tax Board and a 60-day notice period are also legally required by 1991 amendments. See
supra note 26 (explaining notice requirements).
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interest.39 The reinstatement is, however, "without prejudice to
any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the
original suspension or forfeiture[.]"'  Modem courts have wholly
ignored the origins of this language as a "savings clause" intended
to validate interim acts, despite the fact that substantially identical
language first appeared in early statutes governing the penalty of
charter forfeiture whereby a corporation "died" and its directors,
39. See CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE §§ 23305, 23305a, 23305b, 23305c (West 1992). Section
23305 provides that taxpayers suffering the suspension or forfeiture prescribed by section 23301 or
23301.5 may be relieved upon written application by an interested party to the Franchise Tax Board
[FB], payment of all taxes, penalties, interest or other obligation owing, and the FTB's issuance of
a certificate of revivor. Id § 23305 (West 1992). Section 23305a provides in pertinent part:
Upon the issuance of the certificate [of revivor] by the [FIB] the taxpayer therein named
shall become reinstated but the reinstatement shall be without prejudice to any action,
defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture,
except that contracts which were voidable pursuant to section 23304.1, but which have
not been rescinded pursuant to section 23304.5, may have that voidability cured in
accordance with section 23305.1 ....
Id. § 23305a (West 1992). Section 23305b gives the FIB discretion to revive a corporation to good
standing, either partially or totally and with conditions, without full payment of taxes, penalties and
interest if it determines the revivor will enhance its tax collection prospects. I. § 23305b (West
1992). Section 23305c, among other things, requires the FB to transmit to the Secretary of State the
revived taxpayer's name and corporate number and makes this information and the fact and date of
revivor a matter of public record. I. § 23305c (West 1992).
40. Id § 23305a (West 1992). The quoted language is derived from 12929 legislation, but the
original appearance of similar language in California revivor statutes appears to have been in 1909.
See 1909 Cal. Stat. ch. 297, sec. 6, at 455 ("provided, the rehabilitation of a corporation under the
provisions of this act [the corporate license tax act] shall be without prejudice to any action, defense
or right which accrued by reason of the original forfeiture .... "). This language was carried over
in further 1911 and 1913 amendments to the original 1905 License Tax Act, and was thereafter
repealed with the rest of the Act, but was reenacted in the subsequent repealing statutes. See Rossi
v. Caire, 186 Cal. 544, 546-47, 199 P. 1042, 1044 (1921) (tracing history of legislation and
amendments); see also 1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 336, sec. 1, at 680-681. The effect and intent of the 1913
statutes containing this language, and the intended effect of the language itself, was discussed in
Rossi, 186 Cal. at 551-52, 199 P. at 1046; see id. (indicating that "crudely drawn" amendments
containing key -without prejudice, etc." language "contemplated that the rehabilitated corporation
should proceed exactly as if no forfeiture had occurred" and that "whole intended scope" of key
language "undoubtedly was to save such actions, defenses and rights as had accrued in the
management of the affairs of the former corporation by the trustees .... "). According to Rossi's
reasoning, the Legislature's concern in including the key language was to ensure that rights accruing
to and against trustees acting for a corporation whose charter had been forfeited would not be lost
when the corporation became rehabilitated. Id. Such a "savings clause" was apparently not originally
intended to confer new and additional rights on third parties to object to interim acts because of a
forfeiture, but to preserve rights accruing as a result of management by the trustees of the "dead"
corporation's affairs. Id
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as trustees, succeeded to its powers, rights, and property."
Instead, the courts have almost universally attempted to attribute an
opposite and antagonistic meaning to this language on the
erroneous assumption that it must refer to special rights conferred
on third parties to nullify "corporate" action because it was taken
during forfeiture or suspension.42 The Legislature unfortunately
appears content to acquiesce in the confused state of the case law,
and has provided no clear guidance as to the effect of revivor on
interim acts.43 By statute, contracts entered by a corporation
41. See supra note 40; see also infa notes 44,53,59-75 and accompanying text (discussing
origins of "without prejudice, etc." language in statutes arguably intended to validate interim acts).
42. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Magyar House, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 2d 182, 190,335 P.2d 487,492
(1959) ("Although no reported case has, as yet, construed the language quoted above, it would
appear to have application, for instance, to a situation where a contract made by the corporation is
voidable because entered into while the corporation's powers, rights and privileges were suspended
[citation], and the fact of reinstatement does not deprive the other party of the right to avoid the
contract."); Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 383,205 P. 446 (1922) (invalidating
new trial motion); Cleveland v. Gore Bros., 14 Cal. App. 2d 681, 58 P.2d 931 (1936) (invalidating
complaint); Belle Vista Inv. Co. v. Hassen, 227 Cal. App. 2d 837 39 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1964),
disapproved by Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Service, Inc., 66 Cal. 2d 368, 372, 425 P.2d 790, 792, 57
Cal. Rptr. 846, 848 (1967) (invalidating judgment); Smith v. Lewis, 211 Cal. 294, 295 P. 37 (1930)
(invalidating judgment); Aihambra-Shuraway Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Gold Mine Corp., 155 Cal.
App. 2d 46,317 P.2d 649 (1957) (invalidating defense); Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 217 Cal.
App. 3d 1509, 266 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1990) (invalidating lawsuit).
43. The 1991 amendments to section 23305 added subdivision (c) thereto providing that where
the FTB has determined a suspension or forfeiture to have been in error, the FIB shall indicate in
connection with the revivor that the taxpayer has been "restored." See CAL. Rnv. & TAX. CODE §
23305c (West 1992). The statute further provides: "The status of the restored taxpayer shall be
retroactive to the date of suspension or forfeiture as if there had been no suspension or forfeiture."
Id. The legislature thus, though probably unintentionally, implies there may be a distinction between
"restoration," which retroactively validates the interim acts of a corporate victim of the FIB's
mistake, and "'revivor." The substance of such an important and critical distinction is the very focus
of this article, and should not be left to chance or guesswork. But see CAL. RE'. & TAX. CODE §
23305.1(c)(l)(B) (West 1992) (retroactively validating certain interim real property transfers).
The signals from the Legislature regarding the intended effect of revivor on interim acts have
been unclear, to say the least. In the early case of Rossi v. Caire, the court stated: "[I]t is clear that
it was contemplated [by the Legislature] that the rehabilitated corporation [previously dissolved under
license tax law charter forfeiture] should proceed exactly as if no forfeiture had occurred, with all
its former powers owning all the property remaining in the hands of the trustees, subject, of course,
to all obligations lawfully incurred by the trustees during the corporation's lapse of life." Rossi v.
Caire, 186 Cal. 544, 551, 199 P. 1042, 1046 (1921) (emphasis added). The Rossi court further noted
that the "crudely drawn" legislative amendments to the statutes at issue, including a provision that
the rehabilitation of a corporation whose charter was forfeited for failure to pay license tax "'shall
be without prejudice to any action, defense or right which accrued by reason of the original
forfeiture," were not intended to refer to a stockholder's purported "right" to prevent rehabilitation
in order to obtain distribution of corporate property held by the directors as statutory trustees in
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during suspension are not void, but (if not cured) are voidable at
the other party's instance by obtaining recessionary relief from a
proper tribunal."
liquidation; rather, "the whole intended scope thereof undoubtedly was to save such actions, defenses
and rights as had accrued in the management of the affairs of the former corporation by the trustee
for the benefit of the former stockholders." Id. (emphasis added). But see Ransome-Crummey Co.
v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 396-98,205 P. 446,447-48 (1922) (citing Rossi in acknowledging
change in the statutory penalty for corporation's nonpayment of franchise and license taxes from
charter forfeiture, which was characterized by Rossi as "absolute death," to "only a suspension of
its rights, powers, and privileges, with a provision for revivor," which Rossi characterized as
"suspended animation"). Ransome-Crummey nevertheless ignored Rossi's statements regarding
rehabilitation and concluded that a suspended corporation's interim acts, "save those expressly
reserved by the statutes," were void. Al
The irony of these seminal cases is the supreme court's questionable conclusion that revival of
a merely suspended corporation did not validate its interim acts, while revival of a moribund
corporation (which had "risen from the dead") did validate its interim acts. The Ransome-Crummey
court's discussion of the effects of revivor and suspension were not only contrary to the more
thoughtful analysis of the matter in Rossi's dicta, but were unsupported by citation to any case law
or demonstration of legislative intent, except for the observation that the statutes did not expressly
make revivor retroactive and did make an individual's performance of interim acts for a suspended
corporation a misdemeanor, a criminal provision supposedly evidencing the Legislature's intent to
withhold retroactive validation of interim acts as a "penalty" for tax delinquency. Id. at 398, 205
P. at 448.
Three significant Legislative amendments to the Corporate franchise tax laws followed
Ransome-Crummey: () Interim contracts were made merely voidable rather than void; (2) the
following phrase was added to the revivor statute section which was the first predecessor of modem
California Revenue and Taxation code section 23305a: "The revivor shall be without prejudice to
any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture,"
and (3) the "without prejudice" language was extended to revivor of subsequently suspended
corporations. Compare 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 13, sec. 32, at 33 with 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 214, sec. 26,
at 360 (interim contracts made voidable); see 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 13, sec. 33, at 33 (addition of
"without prejudice" language); see also Historical Notes to Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §§ 23305,
23305a (West 1992) (derivation); 1929 Cal. Stat. ch. 13, sec. 33, at 33 (extension of "without
prejudice" language to subsequently suspended corporations). This is some evidence of the
Legislature's subsequent rejection of Ransome-Crummey's view that revivor did not retroactively
validate interim acts in favor of Rossi's contrary view. Unfortunately, Ransome-Crummey became a
leading case which would shape the law for decades to come, and which, having not yet been
overruled, continues to exert a deleterious influence. The Legislature, also unfortunately, no longer
seems to understand the origins of its statutes and does not seem to appreciate the magnitude of the
"retroactive validation" problem.
44. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 23304.1,23304.5,23305.1 (West 1992); Gardiner Solder
Co. v. Superior Alloy Corp. Inc., 232 Cal. App. 3d 1537, 1543, 284 Cal. Rptr. 206, 209 (1991);
Damato v. Slevin, 214 Cal. App. 3d 668, 674,262 Cal. Rptr. 879,883 (1989); White Dragon Prod.,
Inc. v. Performance Guarantees, Inc., 196 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170-72, 241 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749-50
(1987). See also Ogden Martin Sys. Inc v. San Bemardino County, 932 F.2d 1284 (1991) (criticizing
as incorrectly decided and refusing to follow White Dragon's holding that tax delinquent foreign
corporation which had failed to qualify to do business in California could be suspended and have
contracts voided without having the Franchise Tax Board submit its name to the Secretary of State).
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2. Legislative Purpose
One logical way to determine the intended scope of revivor is
to examine the intended purpose of suspension. The California
Supreme Court, in an opinion which can be read as an endorsement
of broad retroactive validation following revivor, has "held that the
purpose of section 23301 ... is to put pressure on the delinquent
corporation to pay its taxes, and that purpose is satisfied by a rule
which views a corporation's tax delinquencies, after correction, as
mere irregularities. ... '' The court further stated that "there is
little purpose in imposing additional penalties after the taxes have
been paid." '  This rather benign view of the Legislature's intent,
however, was reached only after a long and painful evolution of the
case law following the supreme court's earlier and contrary view
of the statutes as punitive in nature, articulated in the case of
Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court.47 Since the supreme
court has thus far been unwilling to expressly overrule the flawed
In substantial 1990 revisions to the suspension and revivor statutes the California legislature repealed
former section 23304 ("Every contract made in violation of this article is hereby declared to be
voidable, at the instance of any party other than the taxpayer.") and replaced it with section 23304.1,
which expressly enlarges its scope to include certain contracts made during periods of corporate
suspension, forfeiture or default under additional provisions of the Revenue and Taxation Code. See
generaUy 1990 Cal. Stat. ch. 926, sec. 7, at 4.; see also Gardiner, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1543 n.2, 284
Cal. Rptr. at 209 n.2. Section 23304.5 apparently adopts and refines a holding of White Dragon, 196
Cal. App. 3d at 670-72, 242 Cal. Rptr. at 85-86, by declaring that rights to void such contracts may
only be exercised in judicial proceedings culminating in a final judgment expressly addressing the
issue and, even then, only after the taxpayer corporation has been allowed a reasonable opportunity
to cure the voidability defect by complying with section 23305.1. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23304.5
(West 1992). Section 23304.5 further specifies rescission as the exclusive remedy if a court finds a
contract voidable under section 23304.1, and rescission may not be granted unless the taxpayer
receives full restitution of benefits provided under the contract. Id Section 23305.1 is a new section
setting forth the conditions and requirements of obtaining from the FIB a "certificate of relief from
voidability." Id § 23305.1 (West 1992). See also Damato, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 671-72, 262 Cal.
Rptr. at 880.
45. Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369, 371, 503 P.2d 285,
286, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29,30 (1972); see also Damato, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 673,262 Cal. Rptr. at 881;
Gar-Lo. Inc. v. Prudential Say. & Loan Ass'n, 41 Cal. App. 3d 242, 244, 116 Cal. Rptr. 389, 390
(1974).
46. Peacock Hl Ass'n, 8 Cal. 3d at 371, 503 P.2d at 286, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
47. 188 Cal. 393,205 P. 446 (1922); see infra text accompanying notes 50-75 (discussing the
Ransone-Crummey decision).
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Ransome-Crummey decision containing its earlier view, the case
law has evolved in inconsistent and confusing fashion, and has
encouraged excessive litigation of positions clearly contrary to the
modernly recognized legislative purpose.
In short, the tension between (1) the modem judicial desire to
temper the perceived harshness of section 23301 as to ultimately
complying corporations, and (2) the much misunderstood legislative
directive of section 23305a that revivor "shall be without prejudice
to any action, defense or right which has accrued by reason of the
original suspension or forfeiture," has resulted in case law and
legislation which incorrectly assume the existence of, yet severely
restrict the scope of, third party "rights" to invalidate interim acts.
The case law thus operates from the flawed premise that, despite
the Legislature's general intention not to further penalize tax
delinquent corporations following revivor, there still exist
unspecified "actions, rights or defenses" which enable third parties
to challenge the validity of such interim acts simply because they
happened while the corporation was suspended.
Having developed from irreconcilable assumptions, the case law
makes it very difficult to predict whether particular interim
corporate acts (such as those in this Article's four hypotheticals)
will be retroactively validated by revivor.4" Though the trend in
California (to the extent one is discernible) appears to be a salutary
one toward broad validation of interim acts regardless of the
context in which they occur, neither the language nor the holdings
of the cases are explicit, and the principles employed are too
abstract to provide anything but vague and uncertain guidelines for
new fact situations.49 At best, the precedents encourage needless
48. Despite the extensive 1990 and 1991 legislative revisions of the relevant suspension and
revivor statutes, primarily in the area of contracts, the relevant language concerning suspension and
revivor outside the contract context has not significantly changed. See, e.g., CAI REV. & TAX. CODS
§ 23305a (West 1992). Thus, judicial decisions under the predecessor versions of these statutes still
accurately reflect the law in this area. Most California decisions deal with the effect of revivor on
interim acts undertaken by a corporation as steps in a pending lawsuit.
49. See, e.g., Peacock Hill Assn, 8 Cal. 3d at 373, 503 P.2d at 287, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 31,
("matters occurring prior to judgment [and after]" validated by revivor); Welco Constr., Inc. v.
Modulux, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 69, 73, 120 Cal. Rptr. 572, 575 (1975) ("Procedural acts in the
prosecution or defense of a lawsuit may be validated retroactively by the corporate revival.");
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litigation. At worst, they actually threaten a judicial relapse into a
regressive and unsupported view which would destroy revivor's
beneficial curative effects, and place California out of step with the
better trends of judicial and legislative development in this area. A
review of some of the leading California cases illustrates the
development of this confused area of law.
3. Leading Cases
The seminal case holding interim acts of a corporation
suspended for nonpayment of taxes to be absolutely void, even
following revivor, is Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court.5"
In Ransome-Crummey, the plaintiff corporation sought to foreclose
an assessment lien on the defendant's property. After judgment for
the defendant, but before notice of the judgment was served, the
plaintiff's corporate powers were suspended for nonpayment of
license and franchise taxes.51 The plaintiff then gave notice of its
intention to move for a new trial and so moved. The defendant
called the plaintiff's suspension to the court's attention. Despite the
plaintiff's subsequent reinstatement only a day after the new trial
motion, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's motion.52
Denying the plaintiff's request for a writ of mandate directing
the trial court to accept jurisdiction of the new trial motion, the
California Supreme Court, interpreting suspension and revivor
Rooney v. Vermont Inv. Corp., 10 Cal. 3d 351, 359, 515 P.2d 297, 302, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358
(1973) ("[R]evival... validated theprocedural steps taken on behalf of the [suspended] corporation
.... ); ABA Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Konold, 198 Cal. App. 3d 720, 724, 244 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30
(1988) ("procedural acts" are validated, while "substantive defenses" are not); see also Benton v.
County of Napa, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1492, 277 Cal. Rptr. 541, 546 (1991) ["Benton H"]
(corporation's "application for and obtaining of [administrative] extension and tolling [of use permit]
were procedural acts [and, hence, retroactively validated by revivor]."). The unsatisfactory nature of
these vague guidelines, as well as "plea in abatement" analysis, is undoubtedly a result of their
troubled origins.
50. 188 Cal. 393, 205 P. 446 (1922).
51. Id. at 394, 205 P. at 447.
52. Id. at 394-95, 205 P. at 447.
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statutes then in force under the state's Political Code,53 held that
because the right to institute or maintain actions was not expressly
reserved by statute to suspended corporations, the receipt of notice
of entry of judgment and the motion for new trial were ineffective
exercises of corporate power and thus nullities.54
53. Id. at 395-96, 205 P. at 447-48. The statutes then in force provided in pertinent part that
"the corporate rights, privileges and powers of every domestic corporation which has failed to pay
said [franchise or other] tax and money penalty shall... be suspended, and incapable of being
exercised for any purpose or in any manner, except to defend any action brought in any court against
such corporation, until said tax with all accrued penalties ... are paid[.]" 1917 Cal. Stat. oh. 214,
sec. 26, at 359-60 [Political Code § 3669(c), subd. (2)]; see Ransome-Crummey, 188 Cal. at 396,205
P. at 447. The statutes also provided that "the corporate rights, privileges and powers of every
domestic corporation which has failed to pay the [license] tax and money penalty ... imposed by
this act shall... be suspended and incapable of being exercised for any purpose or in any manner,
except to execute and deliver deeds to real property in pursuance of contracts therefor made prior to
such time, and to defend in court any action brought against such corporation, until said tax with all
accrued penalties... are paid[.]" 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 215, sec. 11, at 377; see Ransome-Crummey,
188 Cal. at 395, 205 P. at 447 (providing legislative history). Both of the above statutory suspension
schemes allowed for revivor in almost identical terms. See 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 214, sec. 26, at 360
("All corporate powers, rights and privileges suspended or forfeited may be revived and restored to
full force and effect by the payment of all accrued taxes and penalties .... "); 1917 Cal. Stat. oh.
215, sec. 12, at 377 ("All corporate powers, rights and privileges, suspended or forfeited under the
provisions of this act may be revived and restored to full force and effect upon application therefor
by any stockholder or creditor thereof and upon payment of all accrued taxes and penalties .... ").
Both relevant statutory schemes also contained an identical proviso, pertaining to revivor of
corporations which had prior to their enactment suffered forfeitures, that "the revivor of a
corporation under the [relevant section] shall be without prejudice to any action or proceeding,
defense or right, which has occurred by reason of the forfeiture." 1917 Cal. Stat. ch. 214, sec. 27,
at 362; 1917 Cal. Stat, ch. 215, sc. 14, at 378-79; see also Rossi v. Caire, 186 Cal. 544, 546, 199
P. 1042, 1044 (1921) (discussing similar earlier provisions "provid[ing] for... revivor [only] as to
corporations that had failed to pay."). While, perhaps, the proviso was intentionally overlooked
because the court deemed it by its express terms to apply only toforfeitures (not mere suspensions),
and only to rights forfeited prior to its enactment, such a reading would promote form over substance
and render the revivor of long dead corporations more effective than that of more recent tax
delinquent corporations. In any event, any such legislative omissions were subsequently cured by
amendments slightly revising the proviso's language, making it applicable to both suspensions and
forfeitures, and making it applicable to corporations subsequently suffering a suspension or forfeiture.
The amendments provided:
Any corporation which has suffered the suspension or forfeiture referred to in the
preceding section may be relieved therefrom upon making application [for revivor] and
paying the tax and the interest and penalties for nonpayment of which the suspension of
[sic] forfeiture occurred.... The revivor shall be without prejudice to any action, defense
or right which has accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture.
1929 Cal. Stat, ch. 13, sec. 33, at 33.
54. Ransome-Crummey, 188 CaL at 397-98, 205 P. at 448. Significantly, the current
suspension and revivor statutes, with minor exceptions, continue to fail to expressly reserve any rights
to suspended corporations.
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Turning to the question whether revivor operated retroactively
or prospectively, the court noted that the statute did not make
revival retroactive.55 The court then opined that "[tihe suspension
of the rights, powers, and privileges is a disability imposed on a
corporation as a penalty, ' 56 and reasoned that the right to bring
or maintain actions, not being expressly reserved, "is denied to
corporations as part of the penalty." 57 The Ransome-Crummey
court cited no cases or other authority in support of this reasoning,
except statutory provisions making an individual's unauthorized
exercise of a suspended corporation's powers punishable as a
misdemeanor.5' Ransome-Crummey's rule and rationale, though
harsh and unsupported, were clear: interim acts were absolutely
void as part of the "penalty" the Legislature supposedly intended
to impose on tax-delinquent corporations.
Ransome-Crummey's approach seemingly stands in direct
opposition to that employed in Rossi v. Caire,59 a case decided by
the California Supreme Court during the preceding year. In Rossi,
a domestic corporation (the Santa Cruz Island Company) had
suffered a forfeiture of its charter in 1911 for nonpayment of its
license tax.' The relevant statute declared that in such
circumstances the corporation's directors became its trustees for
purposes of its liquidation. 6' The corporation's directors took no
55. Id at 398, 205 P. at 448.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 397, 205 P. at 448. It is interesting to observe that the Ransome-Crummey court's
position that (1) the disability of corporate suspension was absolute but for rights expressly reserved,
(2) the statutory revival was not made retroactive and was "part of the penalty" imposed for
corporate tax delinquency, and (3) any other reading of the statutes would weaken their punitive force
and encourage corporate tax delinquency, was essentially the same position taken by Justice Mosk
in his strong dissent in Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369, 374-78,
503 P.2d 285, 288-90, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32-34 (1972) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
58. Ransome-Crummey's reasoning was unsound, out of sync with the Legislature's probable
intent, and later legislatively superseded in any event. Additionally, what is perhaps the leading out-
of-state case in the area has reasoned that the presence of a misdemeanor provision such as that relied
on by Ransome-Crummey mitigates against the finding of a need for additional penalties or remedies
for tax delinquency following revivor. See J.B. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind, 70 A.2d 72, 76 (NJ. 1949);
infra note 260. Finally, the presence of the misdemeanor provision is common even in states where
all interim acts are clearly retroactively validated by statute.
59. 186 Cal. 544, 199 P. 1042 (1921).
60. Id. at 545, 199 P. at 1043.
61. Id. at 547, 199 P. at 1044.
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steps to liquidate its assets and, following 1913 legislation
authorizing its revivor, proceeded to revive the corporation,
thereafter delivering all assets held by them back to the
corporation.62 A stockholder's successor-in-interest opposed this
action, and timely sued the directors to obtain an accounting and
distribution of the corporation's assets to the stockholders. 63 The
plaintiff stockholder's successor lost; the plaintiff and one director
appealed from the adverse judgment and an order denying their
motion to set aside the same.6
The supreme court reversed on the ground that the 1913 revivor
amendment could not constitutionally impair the stockholder's
previously vested property right to enforce a complete liquidation
by the directors as trustees in liquidation.65 Concededly, under the
"loosely" and "crudely drawn" 1913 amendments, the Legislature
intended to enable the directors to rehabilitate the corporation and
"contemplated that the rehabilitated corporation should proceed
exactly as if no forfeiture had occurred, with all its former powers
and owning all the property remaining in the hands of the trustees,
subject, of course, to all obligations lawfully incurred by the
trustees during the corporation's lapse of life."' Moreover, the
court rejected appellants' argument that the statutory "proviso that
such rehabilitation 'shall be without prejudice to any action,
defense or right which accrued by reason of the original
forfeiture' showed an intent to save a stockholder's right to
prevent rehabilitation.67 Rather, "the whole intended scope [of
such language] undoubtedly was to save such actions, defenses and
rights as had accrued in the management of the affairs of the
former corporation by the trustees for the benefit of the former
stocldolders."' Nevertheless, this astute observation of the intent
behind the 'without prejudice' clause was fated to become soon-
62. Id. at 547-48, 199 P. at 1044.
63. Id. at 545-48, 199 P. at 1043-44.
64. Id. at 545, 199 P. at 1043.
65. Id. at 550-54, 199 P. at 1045-47.
66. Id. at 551, 199 P. at 1046.
67. Id. at 552, 199 P. at 1046.
68. Id. (emphasis added).
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forgotten dicta. The 1913 amendment could not be given effect in
contravention of the former stockholder's vested right to force a
liquidation, which right accrued under a prior statutory scheme (in
effect on the 1911 date of forfeiture) that did not provide for
revivor.6
While Rossi involved a forfeiture rather than a suspension, that
distinction is insignificant to its applicable teachings about (1) the
intended effect of revivor7° and (2) the 'without prejudice'
proviso, which are common to both areas. The first teaching of
Rossi, totally ignored by Ransome-Crummey, is that the Legislature
intended a revived corporation to "proceed exactly as if no
forfeiture had occurred, with all its former powers and owning all
property remaining in the hands of the trustees, subject, of course,
to all obligations lawfully incurred by the trustees during the
corporation's lapse of life."71 This indicates that those acting as
agents for a suspended corporation do so as trustees with
corresponding fiduciary duties, rights, obligations, and liabilities.
Logic dictates that the onerous liabilities and obligations of a
trustee should be sufficient to encourage compliance with the tax
laws and a revivor. This, in turn, should shift such duties (along
with any corresponding rights) back to the revived corporation,
which would then proceed just as if no forfeiture had occurred. If
the corporation is not revived, the trustees could be held liable in
that capacity for any obligations incurred in its name--a just result.
69. Id. at 552-53, 199 P. at 1046-47. As stated by the court,
The corporation was dead, and had died without any existing provision of law for its
revivification... The status with relation to the property [i.e., held in trust for liquidation
purposes only by directors] had been created, and the terms of the trust upon which it was
held defined. We do not see how it can be held that the rights of former stockholders
under the trust defined by the statute, the rights subject to the payment of the former
corporation debts and expense of liquidation, to have the property distributed among them,
was not a vested property right secure against impairment by subsequent act of the
legislature.
Id.
70. It seems safe to assume that the Legislature did not intend for revivor to operate in such
a fashion that interim acts taken during "absolute death" (i.e., forfeiture) would be given greater
effect that those taken while in mere "suspended animation" (i.e., suspension).
71. Rossi, 186 Cal. at 551, 199 P. at 1046.
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The second teaching of Rossi is that the "without prejudice"
proviso is nothing more than a saving clause meant to assure that
interim acts of the trustees are preserved and confirmed as those of
the corporation upon revivor. 2 It would obviously be unfair for
the temporary void in the corporate existence to prejudice rights,
actions or defenses accruing in favor of or against trustees or third
parties dealing with them as a de facto corporation. Unfortunately,
Rossi's teachings were completely lost on the Ransome-Crummey
court. The court seemed to recognize that suspension was, if
anything, a milder penalty than forfeiture.73  Nevertheless,
Ransome-Crummey did not attempt to save (and thus "prejudiced")
an interim act undertaken for the revived corporation's benefit.
7 4
The court reasoned that the act was void and beyond cure as a
penalty.75
Forty-five years after Ransome-Crummey, the supreme court
revisited the issue and reached a different result under a different
"plea in abatement" theory. In Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Service,
Inc.," a corporation was sued and filed an answer and cross-
complaint against appellant while in good standing.' Thereafter,
its corporate powers were suspended for nonpayment of taxes.78
During this suspension, it won judgment against the appellant on
its cross-complaint and the period for appeal from that judgment
expired.79  The appellant then discovered the suspension,
unsuccessfully moved to vacate the final judgment, and appealed
from the order denying the motion to vacate.8" Only following the
appeal was the corporation reinstated."
72. Id. at 552, 199 P. at 1046.
73. Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 396, 205 P. 446, 447 (1922).
74. Id. at 397, 205 P. at 448.
75. Id. at 398, 205 P. at 448.
76. Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Ser,., Inc., 66 Cal. 2d 368, 425 P.2d 790, 57 Cal. Rptr. 846
(1967).
77. Id. at 369, 425 P. at 791, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 847.
78. Id.
79. Id
80. Id.
81. Id
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The supreme court affirmed the order denying the motion to
vacate the judgment in favor of the suspended corporation. Because
the corporation's lack of capacity did not appear on the face of the
judgment roll, the judgment itself was not void. 2 Invoking the
common law concept of a "plea in abatement, ' 8 3 the court
further noted that "a plea of lack of capacity of a corporation to
maintain an action by reason of a suspension of corporate powers
for nonpayment of its taxes is a plea in abatement which is not
favored in law, is to be strictly construed, and must be supported
by facts warranting the abatement at the time of the plea."'8 4
For this proposition the court cited (1) appellate cases in which
a corporate plaintiff, suspended before commencing a lawsuit, had
been reinstated before trial and allowed by the court to proceed, 5
82. Id. at 370, 425 P.2d at 847, 425 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
83. See BLACK'S LAW DicTnONARY 1037 (5th ed. 1979) (plea in abatement does not go to
merits of plaintiff's claim, but to place, mode or time of asserting it, and does not destroy claim, but
merely postpones its prosecution).
84. Traub, 66 Cal. 2d at 370, 425 P.2d at 791, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 847 (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
85. Id. The Traub court relied on the following cases: Maryland Cas. Co. v. Superior Court,
91 Cal. App. 356, 357-58, 360-64, 267 P. 169, 170-72 (1928) (plaintiff corporation/mechanic's lien
claimant when contract executed and when suit filed was suspended but revived a year before trial
on merits; held even if defense of incapacity of plaintiff to sue was not waived by defendant's failure
to assert it in answer, defendant's motion to dismiss based thereon was "plea in abatement which
is not favored in law, is to be strictly construed, and must be supported by facts warranting the
abatement at the very time of the plea."); Hall v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 53 Cal. App.
2d 625, 630-31,128 P.2d 545, 548-49 (1942) (permitting suspended corporation revived subsequent
to interposition of plea in abatement question, but before the hearing of the plea, to proceed with
action commenced during suspension); Pacific Ad. Wine, Inc. v. Ducini, 111 Cal. App. 2d 957,967,
245 P.2d 622, 628 (1952) (permitting suspended corporation which was revived subsequent to filing
of action, but prior to trial, to proceed).
The most interesting of these cases is Maryland Cas. Co., which relies heavily on a 1916 Court
of Appeal decision in Kehrlein-Swinerton Constr. Co. v. Raphen, 30 Cal. App. 11, 156 P. 972 (1916),
and somewhat disingenuously characterizes Ransome-Crummey as a case "indicat[ing] that after a
corporation has properly instituted a suit, its corporate power to maintain the action may be
suspended for failure to pay license and franchise taxes for a period of time while the action is
pending and then go forward with full vigor when reinstated." Maryland Cas. Co., 91 Cal. App. at
362, 267 P. at 171. The Court of Appeal decision in Kehrlein-Swinerton, which preceded the
Supreme Court decision in Ransome-Crummey by six years, involved the same type of statutory
forfeiture scheme later dealt with in Rossi, one in which a corporation's forfeiture for failure to pay
its license tax resulted in its directors becoming trustees of its property. See Kehrlein-Swinerton, 30
Cal. App. at 16, 156 P. at 974. The case involved the issue of whether the plaintiff (a corporation
suspended prior to its filing of the action) had the right to have its directors substituted as real parties
upon motion made at trial. Id. at 13-14, 156 P. at 972-72. Noting a conflict in the cases, the court
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and (2) other cases, including two of its own pre-Ransome-
Crummey decisions, holding lack of corporate capacity to be an
affrmnative defense." Accepting the holdings of these cases,
which ran directly contrary to its earlier Ransome-Crummey
stated:
There are two lines of cases which seem to run parallel bearing upon this question. The
courts of last resort in this state have gone far in holding that corporations which have
permitted themselves to come within the ban of the statute by failing to pay their license
tax cannot be permitted to do business in this state while under such disability, and it has
also been definitely decided that the institution and maintenance of an action is embraced
within the inhibition of the statute with respect to doing business after such forfeiture of
a corporate charter.
On the other hand, it has been held in a long line of well-considered cases bearing
upon the rights of partnerships or of corporations to commence or maintain actions until
they have complied with certain requirements of the Legislature restricting such right, that
the plea and proof that such partnerships and corporations may not maintain actions while
under the disabilities provided in such statutes are matters of affirmative defense, and are
in the nature of dilatory pleas, which are waived by the failure on the part of the
defendant to make the required averments and proof; and that in the absence of such plea
and proof a partnership or a corporation, although subject to such disabilities, may still
maintain an action and recover and enforce a judgment therein in its own name.
Id. at 14-15, 156 P. at 973 (citations omitted). Following the latter line of cases, and relying on the
statutory "'winding-up" powers of former directors/trustees, the Kehrlein-Swinerton court held that
the trial court abused its discretion in disallowing the substitution and reversed the order of dismissal
and judgment. Id. at 15-17, 156 P. at 974. Maryland Cas. Co. follows Kehrlein-Swinerton's holding
that actions filed by corporations whose franchises are forfeited are not ipsofacto nullities and adopts
"'plea in abatement" analysis. Maryland Cas. Co., 91 Cal. App. at 362-63, 267 P. at 171-72. The
court ties this analysis into the pertinent 'without prejudice' proviso of the relevant statute by stating:
The only defense or right petitioner ever had to dismiss the action by reason of the
original suspension, as distinguished from its right to prevail in the action upon its merits,
was a plea in abatement which under established law and precedent was a temporary right
that could only be availed of during the period of plaintiff's incapacity. The revivor of the
corporation does not prejudice the defense, which petitioner was at ful liberty to use
during the period of suspension, but restores the corporation so that no future defense can
be made on that ground. After the corporation is restored, it has power to maintain an
action not previously dismissed. This interpretation is in harmony with section 11, which
suspends the corporate powers only until such tax is paid in accordance with the act. A
different construction would extend the period of suspension beyond that expressly fixed
by the act.
Id. at 363-64, 267 P. at 172.
86. Traub, 66 Cal. 2d at 370-71 n.3, 269 P. at 791 n.3, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 847 n.3 (citing
Schwartz v. Magyar House. Inc., 168 Cal. App. 2d 182, 187-89, 335 P.2d 487, 490-91 (1959)
(holding a court may grant litigant's motion for continuance, or order same sua sponte, in order to
allow litigant to secure reinstatement so as to participate in trial), Alaska Salmon Co. v. Standard Box
Co., 158 Cal. 567, 570, 112 P. 454, 455 (1910) (concluding that "extraneous fact" of corporate
plaintiff's incapacity is affirmative defense), and Califomia Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Harris, 111 Cal.
133, 43 P. 525 (1896) (holding corporation's failure to file certified copy of its articles of
incorporation with county clerk was likewise matter in abatement)).
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analysis, the court then reasoned that because corporate incapacity
at the time a corporation files an action does not deprive a court of
jurisdiction to proceed, neither does incapacity occurring after filing
but before judgment.Y7 The court was careful to distinguish its
holding with respect to the final judgment from cases holding an
unreinstated corporation lacks the right or capacity to defend or
appeal,"8 cases involving the effect of dissolution or forfeiture,
rather than mere suspension, 9 and cases involving the running of
the statute of limitations against an unreinstated plaintiff
corporation.'
Down playing that aspect of Traub which emphasized that
corporate incapacity resulting from suspension and not appearing
on the record does not ipso facto deprive a court of jurisdiction to
render a final judgment,91 the supreme court, a mere five years
later, in Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co.,92
chose to emphasize (in the context of a motion to dismiss a
87. Traub, 66 Cal. 2d at 371, 425 P.2d at 792, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id. at 372, 425 P.2d at 792, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 848. The Traub court also simply
distinguished Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393,205 P.446 (1922), as dealing
with "the special jurisdictional problems incident to a motion for new trial[.] Traub, 66 Cal. 2d at
372, 425 P.2d at 792, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 848; see Peacock Hill Assn v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co.,
8 Cal. 3d 369, 373-74, 503 P.2d 285, 287, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 31 (1972) (acknowledging limitation
of Ransome-Crummey by Traub to motion for new trial context). As shall appear below, it is crystal
clear that Ransome-Crummey's entire approach, if not its so-called "limited" holding, has been
effectively (though not expressly) overruled by Peacock Hill. See infra notes 92-101 and
accompanying text. The Traub court also expressly disapproved any contrary views expressed in
Belle Vista Inv. Co. v. Hassen, 227 Cal. App. 2d 837, 39 Cal. Rptr. 184 (1964), a case which relied
on Ransome-Crummey in holding revivor was not retroactive. Traub, 66 Cal. 2d at 372, 425 P.2d at
792-93, 57 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49. In the final analysis, of course, it remains unexplained why the
jurisdictional problems incident to a motion for new trial are more "special" or problematic than
those associated with incapacitated corporations filing complaints, taking judgments, or appealing.
See, e.g., cases cited by Benton II, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1490-91,277 Cal. Rptr. 541,545 (1991).
While it is possible that Ransome-Crummey could have been logically distinguished if its facts
showed the revivor therein had occurred only after the running of the "jurisdictional" period in
which to move for a new trial, its facts indicate that this was not the case and its rationale clearly
indicates such was not the basis for its rejection of any retroactive effect of revivor. Ransome-
Crummey, 188 Cal. at 394, 397-98, 205 P. at 446-48. It can only be concluded that Ransome-
Crummey is a doctrinal relic whose rule, if still vital, should not be since it depends on a distinction
without a difference.
91. Traub, 66 Cal. 2d at 371,425 P.2d at 792,57 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
92. Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d 369, 503 P.2d 285, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29.
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suspended corporation's post-judgment appeal) that portion of
Traub which "cited with approval several court of appeal decisions
in which the corporate plaintiff was allowed to maintain a lawsuit
even though it had been suspended at the time it filed its
complaint." 93 As noted above, this line of decisions and its "plea
in abatement" analysis are in irreconcilable conflict with the
doctrine of Ransome-Crummey that interim acts are void
notwithstanding revivor.
The Peacock Hill court, in the complete turnaround from the
discredited Ransome-Crummey approach94 signaled by Traub,
adopted the reasoning of the lower appellate court decisions "that
the plea of lack of capacity of a corporation because of its
suspension for failure to pay taxes, is a plea in abatement which is
not favored in law and must be supported by the facts at the time
of the plea." 95 Peacock Hill also cited with approval other lower
court cases applying the so-called Traub rule in other situations.96
'93. Id. at 372, 503 P.2d at 286, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 30. The Peacock Hill court cited the
following cases: Pacific Ad. Wine Inc. v. DuccinL, 111 Cal. App. 2d 957, 967, 245 P.2d 622, 628
(1952) (holding suspended plaintiff corporation could proceed after pre-trial revivor); Hall v. Citizens
Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 53 Cal. App. 2d 625, 631, 128 P.2d 545, 549 (1942) (concluding that
revival of suspended corporate plaintiff after defendant's answer and plea in abatement based on
suspension, but before a hearing of the plea, was sufficient to avoid the plea of incapacity), and
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Superior Court, 91 Cal. App. 356,361-63,267 P. 169, 171-72 (1928) (finding
denial of motion to dismiss or abate based on suspended corporate plaintiff's incapacity was proper
where plaintiff had been revived by time of motion). Id.; see supra note 85 (discussing the reasoning
underlying the court's holding in Maryland Cas. Co.).
94. See supra text accompanying notes 50-75.
95. Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d at 372, 503 P.2d at 286, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 30. See Benton I1, 226
Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1491, 277 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545 (1991) (concluding the underlying rationale of
these cases is based on the concept of a plea in abatement).
96. Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d at 372-73, 503 P.2d at 286-87, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31. All the
cases cited involved the effect of revivor on corporate acts undertaken in the litigation context. In
addition to the decisions discussed above, the court cited: A.E. Cooke Co. v. K.S. Racing Enter. Inc.,
274 Cal. App. 2d 499,500,79 Cal. Rptr. 123,123-24 (1969) (holding suspended corporate plaintiff's
writ of attachment validated where revivor occurred after suit filed and attachment obtained, but prior
to filing of defendant's motion to dissolve attachment); Duncan v. Sunset Agric. Minerals, 273 Cal.
App. 2d 489, 493, 78 Cal. Rptr. 339, 342 (1969) (concluding that since corporate defendant,
suspended during period from before commencement of action and through trial, was revived while
cause was under advisement, lower court therefore abused its discretion by granting plaintiff
judgment based on "technicality" of defendant's lack of capacity rather than deciding case on its
merits); and Diverco Constructor's Inc. v. Wilstein, 4 Cal. App. 3d 6, 12, 85 CaL Rptr. 851, 855
(1970) (plaintiff corporation, suspended after it filed action and during period in which it moved to
accelerate trial to avoid five year dismissal statute, was reinstated two days before defendant's motion
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The supreme court, referring to all these cases, stated "[t]he
foregoing authorities make clear that as to matters occurring prior
to judgment the revival of corporate powers has the effect of
validating the earlier acts and permitting the corporation to proceed
with the action."' The supreme court then applied this rather
broad and amorphous "rule" of retroactive validation of interim
acts to the case before it to validate the appeal taken by the
suspended corporation before its revivor, stating "that the same
rule should ordinarily apply with respect to matters occurring
subsequent to judgment."98 The easy adoption and extension of
the reasoning of Traub was aided by the court's assertion of a non-
punitive legislative purpose for the tax collection and suspension
statutes--a purpose of merely pressuring a delinquent corporation
to pay its taxes.99 This newly perceived purpose was, of course,
completely at odds with the punitive purpose the court had
perceived half a century earlier in Ransome-Crummey, °° the
latter also being the view urged in Justice Mosk's stinging
dissent.101
A new and unfortunate analytical wrinkle began to appear in
the supreme court's analysis with the advent of its decision in
Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp., °2 the year following
to dismiss for lack of capacity which resulted in the case being taken off calendar, held, trial court's
later dismissal for want of prosecution was abuse of discretion in light of court's earlier erroneous
act of placing case off calendar where revival had rendered capacity argument groundless and, but
for such error, case would have been brought to trial within time required). Xa
97. Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d at 373, 503 P.2d at 287, 105 Cal. Rptr at 31.
98. Id
99. Id. at 371,503 P.2d at 286, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 30 ("Mhe purpose of section 23301 ..
is to put pressure on the delinquent corporation to pay its taxes, and that purpose is satisfied by a rule
which views a corporation's delinquencies, after correction, as more irregularities... There is little
purpose in imposing additional penalties after the taxes have been paid."). The court's assertion is
undoubtedly correct and is remarkable only in fight of the Ransome-Crummey doctrine, which it did
not expressly overrule. See supra notes 50-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Ransome-
Crummey doctrine).
100. See supra notes 55-58, 99 and accompanying text. The newly perceived non-punitive
legislative purpose was, however, completely consistent with the view of section 23305a's -without
prejudice," etc. language as a savings clause. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text
(suggesting section 23305a may be viewed as a "savings clause").
101. See Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d at 374-78,503 P.2d at 288-90,105 Cal. Rptr. at 32-34 (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
102. 10 Cal. 3d 351, 515 P.2d 297, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1973).
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Peacock Hill. Rooney followed Peacock Hill in validating an
appeal taken by a suspended corporation which was revived at
some point following the commencement of the filing of appellate
briefs. 3 It also proved, however, to be the unwitting catalyst for
an entirely new "procedural /substantive" analysis of revivor's
effect on interim acts when it stated: "The revival of corporate
powers validated the procedural steps taken on behalf of the
corporation while it was under suspension and permitted it to
proceed with the appeal." 1°4 Subsequent appellate courts, ever
alert for a key to understanding this confused area, mistook this
apparently gratuitous descriptive statement for a substantive
doctrinal signal.
Two years later, the court of appeal in Welco Construction, Inc.
v. Modulux °5 seized on Rooney's use of the word "procedural"
in an attempt to harmonize the "plea in abatement" line of cases
with those cases still following the Ransome-Crummey doctrine in
the statute of limitations area. The court stated:
It is clear from these holdings that procedural acts in the
prosecution or defense of a lawsuit may be validated
retroactively by the corporate revival. It is equally clear that
the recent holdings [retroactively validating interim acts] do
not apply to substantive defenses that have accrued during
the corporate suspension. The statute of limitations is not a
procedural right but is a substantive defense. 6
103. Id. at 359, 515 P.2d at 302, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
104. Id (citing Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d at 373, 503 P.2d at 287, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 31).
105. 47 Cal. App. 3d 69, 120 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1975).
106. Id. at 73, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 575; see id. at 74, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 575 ("The statute of
limitations was a substantive defense which accrued by its running during that period of appellant's
suspension, and cannot be prejudiced by revival of the suspended corporation."). The Welco court
buttressed its analysis by observing that "[s]tatutes of limitation are 'vital to the welfare of society'
and are favored by the law ... to be viewed as statutes of repose, and as such constitute meritorious
defenses." Id. at 73-74, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 575 (citations omitted).
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Later court of appeal decisions have accepted and echoed the
Welco court's reasoning with little additional analysis. 7
One recent decision, Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder,10 8
exemplifies the modem courts' uniform failures to (1) trace the
statute of limitations exception to the discredited Ransome-
Crummey doctrine,' °9  (2) recognize the incompatibility of
Ransome-Crummey and "plea in abatement" analysis,110 and (3)
recognize the Legislature's original intent that the "without
prejudice" proviso serve solely as a savings clause. Sade Shoe, in
affirming a summary judgment for the defendant against a
corporate plaintiff based on the running of the statute of limitations
subsequent to the filing of the action but prior to the plaintiff's
substantial compliance with the revivor statutes, stated:
If the statute of limitations runs out prior to revival of a
corporation's powers, the corporation's action will be time
barred even if the complaint would otherwise have been
timely. [citations] A corporation is so barred because, under
Section 23305a, the issuance of a certificate of revivor is
107. See Electronic Equip. Express, Inc. v. Donald H. Seller & Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 834,845,
176 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245 (1981) ("[W]here a substantive defense accrues during a corporate
suspension, it cannot be prejudiced by revival of the suspended corporation." Nevertheless, the court
held that defendants voluntarily filing cross-complaint against suspended corporate plaintiff before
running of statute of limitations waived that affirmative defense); ABA Recovery Services. Inc. v.
Konold, 198 Cal. App. 3d 720, 725 n.2, 244 Cal. Rptr. 27, 30 n.2 (1988) (recognizing Welco's
standard that "'procedural acts in the prosecution or defense of a lawsuit may be validated
retroactively by the corporate revival, but substantive defenses accruing during the corporate
suspension may not" and, nevertheless, questioning Rooney's characterization of filing a notice of
appeal as a merely "procedural step"); Benton II, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1490, 277 Cal. Rptr. 541,
545 (1991) ("The cases have created a distinction between procedural and substantive acts. The
revival of corporate powers validates any procedural step taken on behalf of the corporation while
it was under suspension."); Id. at 1491, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 545 ("However, substantive defenses
accruing during corporate suspension may not be applied [sic] to the benefit of the now-revived
corporation. [citation] For example, the statute of limitations is regarded as a substantive defense, not
a procedural right.").
108. 217 Cal. App. 3d 1509, 266 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1990).
109. See, e.g., Hall v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Say. Bank, 53 Cal. App. 2d 625, 128 P.2d 545
(1942); Cleveland v. Gore Bros., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 2d 681, 58 P.2d 931 (1936); infra notes 161-70
and accompanying text (discussing statutes of limitations exception).
110. See Kehrlein-Swinerton Constr. Co. v. Raphen, 30 Cal. App. 11, 14-15, 156 P. 972,973
(1916); supra note 85 (discussing and quoting Kehrlein-Swinerton).
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"without prejudice to any action, defense or right which
has accrued by reason of the original suspension of
forfeiture. [citations] 11
The invalidity and absurdity of this reasoning is manifest to anyone
who attempts to reconcile how obtaining a judgment or taking an
appeal can be merely "procedural," and thus, retroactively
validated, while the filing of a complaint is "substantive" and
cannot be retroactively validated outside the limitations period.
Heightening this absurdity is the fact that the successful defendant
in Sade Shoe (as in similar cases) was not prejudiced at all, was
fully, timely, and formally notified of the plaintiff's claims by an
actually filed and served complaint, and simply received an
unearned windfall totally unrelated to the merits in securing
dismissal.
Potentially more troublesome even than the problems created
by this body of law in the litigation area are the problems it creates
outside that area. While Peacock Hill is perhaps the most
significant recent supreme court decision on revivor retroactivity
issues, its holding, strictly read, is limited to the factual context of
litigation, and thus leaves open many questions (such as those
posed in this Article's four hypotheticals) about the effects of
suspension and revivor outside the contract and litigation areas." 2
111. Sade Shoe Co. v. Oschin & Snyder, 217 CaL App. 3d 1509, 1513,266 Cal. Rptr. 619,622
(1990) (citing CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23305a (West 1990)); Welco Constr., Inc. v. Modulux, 47
Cal. App. 3d 69, 120 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1975); ABA Recovery Serv., Inc. v. Konold, 198 Cal. App. 3d
720, 244 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1988)). The Sade court rejected plaintiff's argument that the filing of its
complaint was a procedural step retroactively validated by revivor, reciting the Welco shibboleth that
"the statute of limitations is not a procedural right but a substantive defense and not subject to
revival." Sade Shoe Co., 217 Cal. App. 3d at 1513 n2, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 622 n.2.
112. While the Court of Appeal in Benton II answered the important question whether the
curative doctrine of retroactive validation would extend to interim acts outside the litigation context,
in doing so it begged the even more fundamental and important conceptual question whether the acts
of an administrative or legislative body outside of the judicial context are rendered infirm in the first
place by a suspended corporation's lack of "capacity". Benton I1, 226 CL App. 3d 1485, 1491-92,
277 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545-46 (1991); compare Sale v. Railroad Commission, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 617-18,
104 P.2d 38, 41-42 (1940) (holding Railroad Commission's acts authorizing transfer of suspended
corporation's trucking rights unaffected byjudlcial procedure doctrine of lack of capacity because
Commission, unlike court, could act sua sponte) with Benton 1, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 1492 n.6, 277
Cal. Rptr. at 546 n.6 (declining to decide correctness of trial court's "'alternative'* holding that county
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While Peacock Hill certainly expresses at least receptivity to (and
a sound policy rationale to support) a comprehensive rule of
retroactive validation, neither its language nor its holding explicitly
address corporate acts outside of the litigation context, an equally
or more important area in which clarification is badly needed.1 3
The supreme court's failure to expressly overrule Ransome-
Crummeyn4 (which held interim acts void based on the perceived
punitive purposes of the tax collection statutes) and its progeny is
clearly the source of much, but not all, of the problem. The lack of
California revivor cases with facts significantly similar to any of
our hypotheticals,1 5 combined with the complete lack of logical
analysis and firm guiding principles in the modem cases or statutes,
renders conclusions in this area necessarily tentative and wasteful
litigation inevitable.
4. California Decisions in the Non-Contract, Non-Litigation
Context
The California suspension/revivor decisions which are most
analogous to any of our hypotheticals are Sale v. Railroad
Commission"6 and Benton v. County of Napa [Benton II]."
These decisions focus, respectively, on (1) the nature of suspension
could extend use permit sua sponte regardless of corporation's suspension). The Benton 1H court also
adopted the unfortunate substantive-procedural distinction espoused in the recent cases. Id.; see infra
notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing Benton Irs application of substantive-procedural
distinction).
113. See supra notes 24-36; infra notes 116-47 and accompanying text (discussing and
illustrating problems areas outside litigation context); supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text
(discussing the Peacock Hill case).
114. Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 205 P. 446 (1922).
115. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text (presenting hypotheticals). But see Sale v.
Railroad Commission, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940); infra notes 116-33 and accompanying
text; Benton I, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1487-92,277 Cal. Rptr. 541,543-46 (1991); infra notes 134-
147 and accompanying text; Thornton v. Phelan, 65 Cal. App. 480, 224 P. 259 (1924); supra note
27 (discussing California revivor cases).
116. 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940).
117. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485,277 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1991). See generally Thornton v. Phelan, 65
Cal. App. 480, 224 P. 259 (1924) (involving a corporate charter forfeiture situation in a factual
otherwise similar to Hypothetical Number 1). See supra note 27 (discussing the Thornton case).
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(Sale), and (2) the effect of revivor (Benton fl) in the non-
litigation, non-contract context.
Sale, which did not actually involve a revivor, addressed the
effect of suspension on corporate acts occurring in the non-judicial,
administrative context with a result just as favorable to the
suspended corporations as a rule of broad retroactive validation.
Sale recognized the validity of non-litigation interim acts
notwithstanding the absence of a revivor, but under an outmoded
method of analysis."' In Sale,"9 petitioners (highway carriers)
challenged a decision of the California Railroad Commission
permitting a competing carrier (whose corporate powers,
unbeknownst to the Commission, had been suspended for
nonpayment of franchise taxes) to sell its operative rights to
another trucking company. 20 After reopening the proceedings and
hearing facts concerning the transferror-corporation's suspension,
the Commission concluded the public convenience and necessity
would not be served by prohibiting the transferee trucking company
from using the old routes and refused to rescind its order.12 '
After concluding that petitioners had standing under the Public
Utilities Act and that the Commission's order was not res
judicata, 122 the supreme court addressed the primary issue of
whether "because the [transferor's] corporate existence was
suspended, it had no power either to transfer its operative rights.
. .or to invoke [the Commission's] jurisdiction to approve the
transfer.' After conceding the validity of the now-discredited
Ransome-Crummey approach,124  the court nonetheless
significantly limited that doctrine's application by characterizing it
as a rule of "judicial procedure" grounded in the fundamental
judicial rule that only parties with capacity can bring a controversy
118. 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940).
119. Id.
120. L at 613-14, 104 P.2d at 39.
121. Id at 614, 104 P.2d at 39-40.
122. Id at 615-16, 104 P.2d at 40-41 (reasoning that where the Commission retained
jurisdiction to alter the order and the petitioners claimed the incapacity defect was jurisdictional, the
Commission's order was not res judicata).
123. Id. at 616, 104 P.2d at 41.
124. Id. at 617, 104 P.2d at 41.
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before a court and invoke its powers. The supreme court
distinguished the nature, jurisdiction, and duties of the
constitutionally-created Railroad Commission from those of law
courts, in holding "that the transferor's legal incapacity to transfer
its operative rights does not affect the validity or regularity of the
[Commission's] order....""
The court first distinguished the passive role of law courts in
adjudicating disputes brought before them from the more active
role of the Railroad Commission, an administrative agency
legislatively granted powers and functions of a clearly non-judicial
character, such as "the right and duty to make its own
investigations of fact, to initiate its own proceedings and in a large
measure to control the scope and method of its inquiries." '26 In
recognizing the rule that a court acquires no jurisdiction over a
controversy until invoked by a party with capacity to act, is one of
judicial procedure not automatically applicable in the
administrative context,' 27 the court held it inapplicable to the
Railroad Commission's proceedings "because the Railroad
Commission, unlike a court, may act sua sponte and is not
dependent upon the appearance of a party to 'invoke' its
jurisdiction.' 1 2'  Even though the Commission's own procedural
rules required an application by all involved parties to consider
ruling on a transfer of operative rights, the rule was not
jurisdictional; rather, the Commission's "powers of surveillance
and supervision over all public utility matter are inherent.'
129
125. Il The court's "'lack of capacity/judicial procedure" analysis was perhaps a convenient
way to avoid expansion of the poorly-reasoned Ransome-Crummey doctrine outside of the judicial
arena, while appearing to respect the doctrine of stare decisis.
126. Id at 618, 104 P.2d at 41.
127. Id. at 618-19, 104 P.2d at 42.
128. Id. at 619, 104 P.2d at 42; see Benton II, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 1492 n.6, 277 Cal. Rptr.
541, 546 n.6 (1991) (illogically declining to reach question of correctness of trial court's similar
ruling on this threshold issue).
129. Sale, 15 Cal. 2d at 619, 104 P.2d at 42. While discussing the Commission's fall-back
argument that its scope of inquiry, based as it was on questions of public convenience and necessity,
deprived it of the authority to consider the legal status of the parties before it, the court recognized
that while generally the Commission usually lacked authority to decide the legal rights of private
parties between themselves, issues such as capacity to transact business would surely impact on, and
be properly decided in the course of, the Commission's decisions. Id. at 620-21, 104 P.2d at 43.
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Although the result in Sale appears sound,'30 the continued
vitality of the major assumptions underlying Sale's reasoning (in
light of the demise of the Ransome-Crummey doctrine) is clearly
questionable. Expressly crediting the reasoning of Ransome-
Crummey, while actually limiting that case's holding and reasoning
quite significantly, Sale viewed the defect stemming from
suspension as a "lack of capacity," which it essentially
characterized as a jurisdictional defect operative only in law
courts."' Modem cases, which implicitly reject the Ransome-
Crummey doctrine, treat complaints of defects arising from
suspension in the litigation context as mere pleas in abatement,
ineffective if not raised prior to revivor.
13 2
As a practical matter, in light of the obvious unresolved tension
between "jurisdictional/lack of capacity" and "plea in abatement"
analysis, practitioners dealing with the issue of the validity of
corporate acts occurring within the context of administrative agency
proceedings or anywhere in the non-litigation context must be
prepared to deal with both approaches. For example, should modem
lawyers encounter the argument that approvals, licenses or permits
issued by administrative agencies are void, they should argue that
Sale controls if the agency had the power or "jurisdiction" to
make the decisions or take the actions at issue sua sponte (and was
130. While a suspension clearly prevents a corporation from legally exercising its own powers,
nothing in any of the suspension and revivor statutes prevents a third party from acting so as to affect
a suspended corporation; this is one situation where the "'unconscious person" metaphor actually has
some merit. While courts, as a matter of public policy, may refuse to lend their aid or recognition
to suspended corporations, such a rule need not apply to others. CAL. ReV. & TAX. CODE § 23301
(West 1992) (preventing a suspended corporation from exercising its own corporate powers).
It should be noted that Sale's analysis largely ignores the issue of capacity to transfer and is
unsatisfactory for that reason. Sale's characterization of the rule denying effect to interim acts as one
of "'judicial procedure" focused on a jurisdictional argument going to the validity of the
Commission's order and, thus, did not adequately analyze the issue of whether the trucking
company's transfer of operative rights which the Commission approved was itself a void or voidable
act as undertaken by a corporation without corporate powers. That issue (assuming a subsequent
revivor, also absent in Sale) would more closely resemble the types of issues raised in this Article's
four hypotheticals and would require a thorough analysis of the purposes of the tax collection statutes
and the effect of their suspension and revivor provisions in non-litigation and non-contract contexts.
This analysis, unfortunately, is something present case law does not provide.
131. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 76-95 and accompanying text.
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thus not without power to render such decisions even absent parties
having capacity to instigate the proceedings). 133 Additionally, they
133. Carried to its logical conclusions, the argument based on Sale is somewhat complex due
to the unclear line separating the inherent from the statutorily-bestowed powers of local governmental
administrative and legislative bodies. For example, it has been held that a County Board of
Supervisors "has no inherent power to grant [a] use permit regardless of the terms of the [applicable]
ordinance." Johnston v. Board of Supervisors, 31 Cal. 2d 66, 74, 187 P.2d 686, 691 (1947); see
Pettitt v. City of Fresno, 34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 822-23, 110 Cal. Rptr. 262, 268 (1973) (granting of
permit by board contrary to ordinance's express terms is of no effect). Johnston and its progeny are
arguably distinguishable because Johnston involved an explicit substantive requirement that the
Planning Commission approve a use permit application before the Board of Supervisors could grant
such a permit Johnston, 31 Cal. 2d at 71-73, 187 P.2d at 690-91. Under the predecessor statute to
the present California Government Code section 65010, it was held that Johnston did not control the
procedural irregularity of a Board of Supervisors' failure to formally transfer a conditional use permit
matter to itself before referring it back to the Planning Commission for further conditions. The statute
cured the "possible procedural technicality," absent a showing of prejudice by the complaining party.
See Ward v. County of Riverside, 273 Cal. App. 2d 353, 78 Cal. Rptr. 46 (1969), passim.
Government Code section 65010, essentially provides that
[fMormal rules of evidence or procedure applicable injudicial actions and proceedings shall
not apply in [administrative] proceeding[s] ... except to the extent that a public agency
otherwise provides" and that "no action, inaction, or recommendation by... [such]
agencies ... shall be held invalid or set aside... by reason of any error, irregularity,
informality, neglect, or omission (hereafter, error) as to any matter pertaining to petitions,
applications, notices, findings, records, hearings, reports, recommendations, appeals, or
any matters or procedure subject to this title, unless ... the error was prejudicial[,]...
the party complaining or appealing suffered substantial injury from that error and... a
different result would have been probable if the error had not occurred ....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65010(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1992).
This statute might go far toward supporting a Sale-based argument in opposition to a claim that
a corporation's suspension prevented its compliance with an allegedly "jurisdictional" administrative
rule. Further, the Legislature, in enacting statutes providing for the adoption and administration of
zoning laws, has declared "its intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that
counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning matters." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 65800 (West 1980). Authority construing this section in conjunction with section
65010's predecessor indicates a trend away from theJohnston-Peirtdoctrine and toward an approach
recognizing more inherent power and fewer jurisdictional defects in connection with local agency
decisions. See, e.g., Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal. App. 3d 48, 61-63,107 Cal. Rptr. 214, 225-26
(1973).
Also, where it is argued that a local time provision (such as an application or appeal period)
has run because a suspended corporation's acts were insufficiently valid to toll it and cannot be
retroactively validated, Edwards v. Steele, 25 Cal. 3d 406,599 P.2d 1365,158 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1979),
and its progeny provide guidance. That line of cases holds that "requirements relating to the time
within which an act must be done are directory rather than mandatory or jurisdictional, unless a
contrary intent is clearly expressed." Id. at 410, 599 P.2d at 1368, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 665 (emphasis
added). In Edwards, the court held that the 40-day period provided by the San Francisco Municipal
Code for the Board of Permit Appeals to act on an appeal was not jurisdictional, and that the Board's
noncompliance by acting outside of the period was not a jurisdictional defect which would invalidate
its decision. Id at 412-13, 599 P.2d at 1369-70, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
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should argue the acts undertaken by the corporation in applying for,
and obtaining, the permits and approvals were merely
"procedural" (i.e., like steps in a lawsuit) and were thus
retroactively validated by subsequent revivor.
The second important California case bearing significantly on
resolution of the questions posed by this Article's hypotheticals is
Benton v. County of Napa [Benton II]."3 In Benton II, a
suspended corporation (Whitbread) applied in July 1988 to the
County of Napa for an administrative extension and tolling of the
life of its already-granted use permit for construction of a winery
and related facilities in Napa County. 135 The extension and tolling
were necessary to allow the permit, which would otherwise have
expired on September 1, 1988, to remain valid until the resolution
of another lawsuit between Benton, a neighboring landowner, and
real party Whitbread.136 The County granted the requested
extension and tolling in August of 1988.137 After first learning of
its suspension in December of 1988, Whitbread became revived in
just over a week.138 Ultimately, Benton sought a mandate to
invalidate the extension and tolling granted by the County, as well
as all related permits, on the theory that Whitbread was without
authority to request or obtain the same during its suspension, and
that the original use permit thus expired on schedule on September
1, 1988.139 The trial court issued an amended judgment denying
the writ of mandate and Benton appealed.
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding
(without citing either Ransome-Crummey 4  or Sale)"' that
Benton's attempts to analogize the situation to a statute of
limitations problem and to characterize Whitbread's acts as
"substantive" and hence incapable of retroactive validation were
134. 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 277 Cal. Rptr. 541 (1991).
135. Id at 1487-89, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 543-44.
136. Id. at 1488, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
137. Maat 1488, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1489, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 544.
140. Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 204 P. 446 (1922).
141. Sale v. Railroad Commission, 15 Cal. 2d 612, 104 P.2d 38 (1940).
1992/An Examination Of California Revivor Law
meritless. 142 Unfortunately, the court of appeal relied on the
troublesome "substantivelprocedural" distinction which has
emerged from the recent case law,143 and failed to grapple with
either the continued vitality of the Ransome-Crummey doctrine or
the prima facie effect of suspension on non-litigation interim
acts.'" The court substituted.a familiar labelling game for more
cogent analysis:
As Whitbread argued to the trial court,
[i]f taking a judgment is a procedural act, if appealing
is a procedural act, then by definition seeling an
extension of time for use permits has got to be
procedural." The trial court agreed with this assessment
of the matter and so do we. The extension does not
establish any new substantive rights; it merely extends
rights already granted for a longer period of time. We
are satisfied that Whitbread's application for and
obtaining of the extension and tolling were procedural
acts. As its corporate status has been revived, we deem
these interim acts to be as valid as if Whitbread's status
had never been suspended. 4
Aside from the obvious definitional problems stemming from
its use of "substantive/procedural" labelling, Benton I's analysis
actually invites further unnecessary and wasteful litigation
regarding the effect of suspension and revivor in the non-litigation
context. The decision can easily be read to suggest the result might
have been different (and adverse to the corporation) had the interim
act of obtaining an initial permit (rather than an extension of an
142. Benton II, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 1491-92, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 545-46.
143. Id. at 1490-92,277 Cal. Rptr. at 544-45; see supra notes 102-14 and accompanying text
(discussing recent case law in California employing "substantive/procedural" distinction).
144. Benton II, 226 CaL App. 3d at 1492 n.6, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 546 n.6.
145. Id. at 1492, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 546.
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existing permit) been involved. 146 Thus, while it intuitively seems
absurd that obtaining, for example, a use permit could be a more
"substantive" act than obtaining a judgment (just as it seems
absurd that obtaining a judgment is merely "procedural"!), the
unfortunate reasoning of Benton II might be read by a corporation's
litigious opponent to suggest just that.147 While the corporation
in Benton II won the battle, the court provided ample ammunition
for future litigants opposed to corporations' interim acts to carry on
the wasteful "war."
5. Summary of General Principles
At present, the few principles that can be extracted with any
degree of certainty from the pertinent California cases and statutes
are:
(a) A suspension of corporate powers is not self-
executing,14 has been characterized as going to the
"capacity" of a corporation to proceed in litigation,149
and does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to render
146. Benton II thus leaves unresolved the questions posed in hypothetical number four
involving a suspended corporation's obtaining original development pennits and approvals. Much
potential litigation might have been averted had the Benton II court simply abandoned the
"substantive/procedural" analysis and recognized that all interim acts should be retroactively
validated by revivor as a matter of legislative intent. Alternatively, it could have affirmed the trial
court's judgment under a Sale analysis-holding that suspension does not affect the acts of a non-
judicial body with sua sponte powers. It did not do so; rather, it illogically treated that threshold
question concerning the effect of suspension as an alternative ruling of the trial court which it
declined to address at all in light of its revivor and retroactive validation analysis. L at 1492 n.6,
277 Cal. Rptr. at 546 n.6.
147. Dicta inthe Ransome-Crummey-era federal decision of McLaughlin Land& Livestock Co.
v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 94 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1938), suggest the court there would
have held a suspended corporation incapable of farming, so as to qualify as a farming corporation
under the Bankruptcy Act provision at issue; however, in that case, the corporation's president had
made a conclusive admission that no interim farming, had been done during the suspension period
in any event, so the court's discussion of the issue was unnecessary to its holding. Id. at 493.
148. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (suspension not self-executing).
149. See, &g., supra notes 84-90, 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing "capacity" of
suspended corporation to proceed in litigation).
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judgment or take action with respect to the suspended
corporation, 150
(b) Suspension, when raised in an attempt to void a
corporation's actions is often characterized as a
disfavored plea in abatement. 1 In other words, it is
said to be a formal and technical objection not going to
the substance or justice of the cause which must be
supported by facts existing at the time of the court's
decision on the plea, thus giving corporations a chance
to revive and proceed (unless precluded by an "action,
defense or right" which has accrued to the other
party); 152
(c) The revival of a suspended corporation normally
retroactively validates its actions as to "matters" both
prior to and subsequent to judgment in the litigation
context, 153 except to the extent substantive defenses or
rights (such as the running of a statute of limitations in
favor of a defendant sued by the corporation) have
accrued in the interim (i.e., before revivor); 154
(d) Acts which a court considers to be "procedural" as
opposed to "substantive" should be validated
retroactively in both the litigation and non-litigation
contexts;
155
(e) Before the recent trend toward broader retroactive
validation (stemming from the California Supreme
150. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text (demonstrating courts have jurisdiction to
render judgment with respect to a suspended corporation).
151. See supra notes 76-101 and accompanying text (discussing "plea in abatement"
characterization).
152. See supra note 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing "suspension" as a technical
objection of plea in abatement); see also BLAcK's LAw DIcrnoNARY 1447 (6th ed. 1990); supra
notes 5, 40-44, 53-75 and accompanying text (discussing origin and effect of language preserving
"'action, defense or right" of other party).
153. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing retroactive validation in general
terms).
154. See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (discussing accrual of substantive rights
such as statute of limitations prior to revivor).
155. See supra notes 102-47 and accompanying text (discussing retroactive validation of
"procedural" acts).
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Court's modem view of the tax suspension statutes as
non-punitive in nature), administrative decisions
involving suspended corporations were more likely than
court decisions to be upheld against the "jurisdictional"
lack of capacity objection because of the inherently
different nature and powers of administrative fora which
allows them to act on suspended corporations sua
sponte).156 With the advent of Benton 11157 and in
light of the prevailing "substantive/procedural"
analysis,158 however, the matter is considerably more
uncertain even if the harsh Ransome-Crummey doctrine
of no retroactive validation has been effectively
overruled;
(f) The purpose of the tax suspension statutes is to
pressure corporations to pay their taxes, and that
purpose is not served by imposing additional
penalties after taxes have been paid with penalties
and interest; 59
(g) Corporate transfers of real property pursuant to contract
are retroactively validated by obtaining relief from
voidability;'" and
(h) Corporations mistakenly suspended are "restored" upon
revival, with complete retroactive effect.16 1
C. Exceptions To California's Doctrine of Retroactive Validation
The one clear "substantive" defense or "right" which it is
held cannot be prejudiced by a corporation's revival is the right of
an opposing defendant to assert the running of the statute of
156. See supra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting administrative
decisions to court decisions involving suspended corporations).
157. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text (discussing Benton II).
158. See supra notes 102-13, 143-47 and accompanying text.
159. See Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369,371,503 P.2d 285,
286, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 30 (1972) (discussing non-punitive purpose of tax suspension statutes); see
also supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
160. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23305.1(c)()(B) (West 1992).
161. Id § 23305c (West 1992).
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limitations as an affirmative defense.1 62 In other words, when the
statute runs on an action filed by a suspended corporation before
the corporate plaintiff is revived, the action will normally be barred
by the corporation's supposed failure to timely file a valid
complaint. 163
The statute of limitations exception was, of course, originally
based on Ransome-Crummey's doctrine that all interim acts were
void and incapable of validation. Since the complaint filed by a
suspended corporation was a "void" act, the statute was not
tolled.' The apparent rationale modernly offered for this
anachronistic exception, as indicated by Welco Construction, Inc.
v. Modulux, Inc.,"6 is that statutes of limitation are crucial to
society's welfare, favored by the law, properly viewed as statutes
of repose, and constitute complete and meritorious defenses.166
162. See, e.g., Community Elec. Serv. v. National Elec. Contr., 869 F.2d 1235, 1238-41 (9th
Cir. 1989) (dismissing plaintiff electrical contracting company's antitrust action against various
defendants where plaintiff was suspended at time of filing initial complaint, but was revived one
month and two days after antitrust statute of limitations had run; court held that although "[n]o
California Supreme Court decision has addressed the situation where the revivor issues after the
statute of limitation has expired[]" California Court of Appeal decisions were unanimous and relied
on the case of Traub Co. v. Coffee Break Serv, Inc., 66 Cal. 2d 368, 425 P.2d 790, 57 Cal. Rptr.
846 (1967), which distinguished Cleveland v. Gore Bros. Inc., 14 Cal. App. 2d 681, 683, 58 P.2d
931,932 (1936) as presenting "statute of limitations problems," and thus precluded conclusion that
California Supreme Court would rule differently); see also Electric Equip. Exp., Inc. v. Donald H.
Seiler & Co., 122 Cal. App. 3d 834, 845-47, 176 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245-47 (1981) (also holding
substantive defense of statute of limitations is waived where defendant fles cross-complaint against
suspended corporate plaintiff before statute runs); Welco Constr., Inc. v. Modulux. Inc., 47 Cal. App.
3d 69, 73, 120 Cal. Rptr. 572, 574-75 (1975) (distinguishing procedural acts validated by revivor
from substantive defenses); Hall v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 53 Cal. App. 2d 625, 630-31,
128 P.2d 545, 548 (1942) (explaining that the statute of limitations is not tolled by complaint filed
during corporate incapacity, and where statute runs before revival, defense based thereon is "not one
in abatement but a defense to the action on the merits."); Cleveland v. Gore Bros., Inc., 14 Cal App.
2d 681, 58 P.2d 931 (1936) (seminal case holding to same effect under authority of Ransome-
Crummey where affirmative defense raised in answer); Benton II, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1485, 1491-92,
277 Cal. Rptr. 541, 545-46 (1991).
163. Community Elec. Serv., 869 F.2d at 1241.
164. See Cleveland, 14 Cal. App. 2d at 683, 58 P.2d at 932 (discussing Ransome-Crummey
decision); see also supra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
165. 47 Cal. App. 3d 69, 120 Cal. Rptr. 572 (1975).
166. Id. at 72-74, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 573-75. It should be noted that the justification for the
statute of limitations exception has largely shifted, following Ransome-Crummey's demise, from that
case's doctrine that interim acts are "void" as part of the "penalty," to the "action, defense or
right" language in section 23305a of California Revenue and Taxation Code. As already shown
above. However, this new rationale depends on a misreading of the legislative purposes underlying
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This line of reasoning, which happily has been recently
questioned,' 6' apparently views statutes of limitation as vesting
in defendants' substantive "rights," (pleadable as affirmative
"defenses" if within the meaning of section 23305a) to be free of
stale claims not brought within the statutorily prescribed time
period.168 These characteristics, though they hardly justify the
exception either as a matter of policy or of statutory interpretation,
may nevertheless prove helpful to practitioners as a practical matter
to distinguish statutes of limitation from other merely "procedural"
time periods or provisions which cut off one party's rights but do
not vest a "right" or "defense" in another party. Examples of
such non-substantive time periods would seem to include the
development permit deadlines involved in this Article's fourth
hypothetical, and the period in which to apply for a use permit
extension involved in Benton 11.169 Ultimately, the statute of
limitations exception fails to offer a logical and satisfactory
rationale why a complaint, which usually is retroactively validated
by revivor, is not in this sole instance.17 °
the language of the "without prejudice" proviso. See supra notes 40-44, 59-172 and accompanying
text (discussing interpretation of the "without prejudice" language).
167. See ABA Recovery Serv., Inc. v. Konold, 198 Cal. App. 3d 720,725 n.2, 244 Cal. Rptr.
27, 30 n.2 (1988); infra note 330 and accompanying text.
168. Cf.Wood v. Elling Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 353, 362, 572 P.2d 755, 760, 142 Cal. Rptr. 696,
701 (1977) (citing Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348 (1944)); see 43 Cal.
Jur. 3d Limitations ofActions § 2, 15-16 (1978). The flaw in extending this reasoning to the situation
where a complaint is actually filed by a suspended corporation is that it promotes form over
substance and assumes the complaint is "void" if the corporation is not revived before the statute
would have run had no complaint been filed. None of the purposes of the tax collection statutes or
the statute of limitations are served by the fiction of treating a complaint filed by any suspended but
subsequently revived corporation as if it had never been filed.
169. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text (discussing Benton Hand nature of merely
directory time limitations); see also Edwards v. Steele, 25 Cal. 3d 406,599 P.2d 1365,158 Cal. Rptr.
662 (1979).
170. The absurdity of the exception can be illustrated by an equally absurd, but equally
"logical" example. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to effect service of
process on all defendants within 120 days of the filing of the complaint or the action will be
dismissed, unless good cause for the failure can be shown. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(j). If a suspended
corporation files a complaint and serves the defendant within the 120-day period, but does not
become revived until after the period has run, is the action subject to dismissal because a suspended
corporation cannot validly effect service or receive its benefit? Is the defendant's "right" to timely
and valid service of the complaint any less important than the right to the complaint's timely and
validfiling? The obvious objection that service was actually made on defendant, and its purpose of
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Another "right" which formerly accrued under section 23305a
of the Revenue and Taxation Code, without vulnerability to
destruction by revivor, was the right of another contracting party
to void at its option a corporation's contract entered into during its
suspension.17' This non-self-executing section dealing with
contracts was clearly penal in nature, except perhaps where the
other contracting party had relied somehow to its detriment on
contracting with a non-suspended corporation. It was, thus, out of
step with the general purposes of the suspension statutes as
expressed by the supreme court in Peacock Hill,72 and that might
explain its codification in a separate statutory provision. As
discussed above, section 23304 was repealed in 1990 and replaced
with provisions which now provide specific procedures for a
corporation to cure its voidable contracts and limit the impact of
suspension in any event to a conditional right of the other party to
rescind the contract upon payment of full restitution.' 73 Older
cases of doubtful vitality held that a judgment in favor of a
corporation in an action brought by the corporation while under the
suspension is not validated by revivor.' 74
By way of contrast to the above, outstanding examples of so-
called "procedural" steps expressly held not to be encompassed
within the "rights" and "defenses" of section 23305a are (1) the
ability to take a default judgment based on an opponent's lack of
capacity,175 and (2) the ability to dismiss an opponent's untimely
appeal. 176 It should be noted that such "procedural" steps have
notification and due process thus fully satisfied, would apply equally in the statute of limitations area.
171. See White Dragon Prod., Inc. v. Performance Guar., 196 Cal. App. 3d 163, 170-71, 241
Cal. Rptr. 745-749 (1987); Schwartz v. Magyar House Inc., 168 Cal. App. 2d 182, 190, 335 P.2d
487, 492 (1959) (discussing option of voiding contract entered into with corporation which was
suspended).
172. Peacock Hill Assn v. Peacock Lagoon Constr., 8 Cal. 3d 369, 503 P.2d 285, 105 Cal.
Rptr. 29 (1972).
173. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing relevant statutory provisions).
174. See Smith v. Lewis, 211 Cal. 294, 300-01, 295 P. 37,40 (1930) (relying on Ransome-
Crummey in dicta stating acts during suspension not validated). Like Ransome-Crummey, Smith has
undoubtedly been effectively overruled, if only sub silentio by subsequent supreme court decisions.
175. Schwartz v. Magyar House, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 2d 182, 190,335 P.2d 487,492 (1959).
176. Peacock Hill, 8 Cal. 3d at 369, 503 P.2d at 285, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 29; Rooney v. Vermont
Inv. Corp., 10 Cal. 3d 351, 359, 515 P.2d 297, 302, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 358 (1973).
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tremendous "substantive" impact, further underscoring the
unsatisfactory nature of the amorphous "substantive/procedural"
distinction.
Having explored California statutory and case law in the
corporate suspension and revivor area, this Article now turns its
attention to the law of other states in search of helpful insights,
reasoning, and trends in the area.
II. ANALYSIS OF OUT-OF-STATE AUTHORImS ON CORPORATE
SUSPENSION AND REVIVOR
Out-of-state decisions as to the validity of interim corporate
acts are conflicting. Significantly, as pointed out by the most
comprehensive annotated survey of the subject available to date,
which still deals with fewer than half the states, the "different
results [reached in different jurisdictions on the issue of validation
of interim acts] are generally attributable to the differences in
statutes as between jurisdictions .... ,,,"
The relevant statutes can broadly be classified into two general
types: (1) Statutes completely silent about the effect of a
corporation's reinstatement on its interim acts ("Type 1"); and (2)
statutes specifying to some degree the effect of revivor on interim
acts ("Type 2").17 Judicial interpretations of the various types
of corporate suspension and revivor statutes, particularly with
respect to their underlying policies and purposes, are, of course,
also crucial to any analysis of out-of-state law.
This section attempts to analyze trends in the out-of-state
authorities from three different perspectives: (1) "trends" in
leading decisions and those with facts most similar to our
177. John P. Ludington, Annotation, Reinstatement of Repealed, Forfeited, Expired, or
Suspended Corporate Charter as Validating Interim Acts of Corporation, 42 A.LR. 4th § 2[a], at
399 (1985).
178. Id; see infra notes 292-304 and accompanying text (surveying the relevant statutes of
important jurisdictions, and revealing that the assessment of whether a statute is "silent" or speaks
to some degree on the subject of retroactive validation is somewhat subjective). The Corporate
Charter Reinstatement annotation classifies California's statute as "silent," which was probably an
accurate characterization up until the 1991 statutory revisions. See John P. Ludington, Annotation,
Corporate Charter Reinstatement, 42 A1LR 4th § 22[b], at 434 (1985).
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hypotheticals;I 79 (2) "trends" in states with statutes and policies
similar to California's;8 and (3) "trends" in "important"
states.
181
A. Trends in Leading and Factually Similar Cases
In Stock Pot Restaurant, Inc. v. Stockpot, Inc.,182 a leading
case from the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals which is factually
similar to hypothetical number two, the court affirmed a decision
of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) granting the
appellee Stockpot, Inc.'s petition to cancel two of the appellant
Stock Pot Restaurant, Inc.'s registrations of "STOCK POT" for
commercial services based on the appellee's prior continued
use."8 3 Along with asserting factual claims challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence before the TTAB to support its
findings, the appellant claimed that the appellee corporation's
temporary dissolution for failure to file required forms invalidated
the appellee's prosecution of the proceedings and constituted an
abandonment of the trademark.' Relying on the applicable
Massachusetts revivor statute, which provided that on revival "the
corporation shall stand revived with the same powers, duties and
obligations as if it had not been dissolved" and that "all acts...
which would have been legal and valid but for such dissolution,
179. See supra text accompanying notes 24-36 (discussing hypotheticals).
180. See infra notes 258-91 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 254-88 and accompanying text. While the author has chosen approximately
one dozen of the most "important" states to survey for this purpose, based on criteria discussed
further below, and has not undertaken an exhaustive state-by-state survey in search of the "majority
view" of statutes and case law in every state and the territories, it has been stated by several
authorities that the "majority" of states recognize retroactive validation of interim acts. See, e.g., 0.
Van Ingen, Annotation, Reinstatement of Repealed, Forfeite Epired or Suspended Corporate
CharterAs Validating Acts In Interim, 13 A..R. 2d 1220 (1950); Kerney v. Cobb, 658 S.W.2d 128,
131 (Tenn. App. 1983) ("majority view"); Mayflower Restaurant Co. v. Griego, 741 P.2d 1106,
1110-11 (Wyo. 1987) ("[Majority view is that ... reinstatement... will validate interim acts
.. " citing G. Van' Ingen, supra).
182. 737 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984). This case was, in fact, the inspiration for the second
hypothetical.
183. Id. at 1578.
184. Id. The dissolution occurred before appellee initiated the cancellation proceedings, and
appellee was revived during the proceedings. Id. at 1578, 1580.
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shall, except as aforesaid, stand ratified and confirmed[,]" the court
held "that provision gave retroactive effect to the revival, including
the propriety of the appellant's continued use of the mark."" 5
The Stock Pot decision was based on Massachusetts law (and
much more clear, explicit and descriptive statutory language than
exists in California),3 6 but it is pertinent to our hypothetical fact
patterns for several reasons: (1) It is a "leading" case from an
"important" state; (2) it involves retroactive validation of
continued use of a trademark, a non-litigation, non-contract act;
and (3) it can be persuasively argued that the same broad rule of
retroactive validation resulting from Massachusetts' statutory
scheme has been mandated through judicial interpretation in
California under the rationale of Peacock Hill.'
17
Other states, too, recognize that revivor erases the void in the
corporate existence created by suspension. In the leading Colorado
185. Id, citing MAss. Am. LAws ch. 156B, § 108 (West 1992). The Massachusetts revivor
statute provides:
If the state secretary finds that the existence of a corporation has terminated in any
manner and that such corporation ought to be revived for all purposes or for any specified
purpose or purposes with or without limitation of time, he may, upon application by an
interested party, file in his office a certificate in such form as he may prescribe reviving
such corporation. The state secretary may subject the revival of such corporation to such
terms and conditions, including the payment of reasonable fees, as in his judgment the
public interest may require. Upon the filing of a certificate reviving a corporation for all
purposes, said corporation shall stand revived with the same powers, duties and
obligations as if it had not been dissolved, except as otherwise provided in said certificate;
and all acts and proceedings of its officers, directors and stockholders, acting or purporting
to act as such, which would have been legal and valid but for such dissolution, shall,
except as aforesaid, stand ratified and confirmed. If such a corporation is revived as
aforesaid for a limited time or for any specified purpose or purposes, it shall stand revived
for such time or for the accomplishment of such purpose or purposes in accordance with
the terms of the state secretary's certificate. For cause shown to his satisfaction, the state
secretary may, by certificate filed as aforesaid, extend the time for which a corporation
revived for a limited time shall stand revived. A certificate filed by the state secretary
pursuant to this section shall constitute an amendment of the articles of organization of
the corporation, effective when filed.
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156B, § 108 (West 1992).
186. As the Stock Pot court noted, "by its very terms Section 108 ... shows that, after revival,
the corporation normally stands, with respect to the acts done during the interim period, as if it had
not been dissolved." Stock Pot, 737 F.2d at 1580.
187. See Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369, 373,503 P.2d 285,
287, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 31 (1972) (holding revivor broadly validates "matters occurring prior to [or
after] judgment" based on non-punitive purposes of statutes).
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decision of Micciche v. Billings,188 for example, the Colorado
Supreme Court held a corporation's suspension for failure to file
a required biennial report did not render its officers personally
liable for a workmen's compensation award entered against the
corporation during its period of suspension under a state statute
imposing joint and several liability on persons assuming to act as
a corporation without authority.189 The court stressed that the
pertinent suspension statute specifically allowed the suspended
corporation to effect certain real estate transactions,'" and that
"[u]nder case law, a corporation reinstated after suspension is
deemed to have had continuous existence throughout the period of
suspension, with the result that the corporation's loss of authority
to transact business does not affect its continued existence as a
legal entity." 1
91
This principle was further explained in Dominion Oil Co. v.
Lamb, " in which the Colorado Supreme Court held (under a
statute silent on the issue) that a contract entered into by a
corporation during suspension was valid after revival because "the
revived corporation is regarded as having had continuous
existence." 193 Dominion Oil quotes a treatise to the following
effect on corporate revival:
The corporation, if revived or reinstated pursuant to statute,
is the same corporation since another corporation cannot be
created by such proceedings. It becomes reinvigorated with
all its old powers and franchises, and with its duties and
obligations. Thereafter, it may sue and be sued.
188. 727 P.2d 367 (Colo. 1986).
189. Id.
190. IAt at 370; see COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-10-109(2) (West Supp. 1991) (Colorado suspension
and revivor statute; subdivision (2) provides in pertinent part, that despite the fact that a suspended
corporation is inoperative, its shareholders may continue to meet and the "'corporation may hold or
continue to hold, encumber, sell, or convey real estate .... "). This is not the case in California,
where the 1990 revisions to Revenue and Taxation Code section 23302 state a contrary rule. See
supra note 7 (discussing the California statute).
191. Micciche, 727 P.2d at 371 (citing People v. Zimbelman, 572 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1977),
Dominion Oil Co. v. Lamb, 201 P.2d 372 (Colo. 1948), and Smith v. Highland Mary Mining, Milling
& Power Co., 259 P. 1025 (Colo. 1927)); see also Bonfils v. Hayes, 201 P. 677 (Colo. 1921).
192. Dominion Oil, 201 P.2d at 372.
193. Id. at 375.
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Reinstatement of the corporation validates previous
corporate acts, unless under the terms of the statute the
delinquent corporation is, during the period of suspension,
wholly without power to act or contract and its attempted
acts or contracts are entirely void.194
The Dominion Oil court noted that no Colorado statute voided
interim acts or made them misdemeanors.'95 It also noted that, in
addition to the explicit legislative penalties, refusal to enforce the
contract would have the effect of enabling the judiciary to further
penalize the corporation in the sum of $32,000, contrary to the
primary purpose of the statutory penalties to collect public revenue
for the support of the government, and not to collect the same in
the interest of private litigants.' 9
In the Massachusetts case of Barker-Chadsey Co. v. WC.
Fuller Co., Inc., 97 a decision addressing an officer liability
problem similar to that in Micciche, the plaintiff wholesaler sued
the defendant corporate buyer, a retail hardware business, for sums
owed under a promissory note made by the defendant's treasurer
for purchased goods. Following the defendant's voluntary private
inventory sale on the plaintiff's account, the plaintiff learned that,
when the note was made, the defendant had been dissolved for
failure to file annual reports or pay franchise taxes. (in fact, the
defendant had been dissolved for many years and was never
reinstated).198 The plaintiff then sought to add claims against the
treasurer and another officer on the theory that they were
194. Id. at 376 (emphasis added). The court cited WIInAM MEADE FLEIT, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7998, at 706 (Ist ed. 1931). Dominion Oil, 201 P.2d at
376. Although the broad language emphasized above no longer appears in the Fletcher treatise, the
current section of that treatise, along with its extensive annotations reflecting the case and statutory
law of various states on the issue, is to the same general effect. See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORAiONS § 7998, at 91-107 (3d ed. 1990) (current
version).
195. Dominion Oil, 201 P.2d at 375.
196. Id at 374-75.
197. 448 N.F.2d 1283 (Mass. App. 1983); see supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text
(discussing the Massachusetts statute).
198. Barker-Chadsey, 448 N.E.2d at 1284.
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personally liable because they represented no corporation in the
transaction. 199
Looking first to the mutual understandings and representations
of the parties as to who would be liable for the note, and finding
that: (1) Liability was understood to be corporate, not individual,
(2) there was no unfair dealing, and (3) the corporate officer was
ignorant of the dissolution, the court next examined the policy of
the statutes dealing with the dissolution and revival of
corporations. °" Finding the statutes gave the Secretary of State
broad discretion to act in the public interest to revive corporations
and validate (either completely, conditionally or selectively) their
past acts, the court took the unusual steps of (1) conditioning its
relief of the defendants from personal liability on their securing "a
revival... sufficient to validate the transactions here involved as
corporate actsL,]" and (2) charging the defendants as trustees for
the plaintiff's benefit of properties they held to which the
corporation would become entitled upon revivor.0 1 Perhaps
significantly, the Barker-Chadsey court cited California's leading
Peacock Hill case in a footnote to support its unusual relief.2°2 It
also found support for its recognition of the validity of the
existence and acts of a seemingly long dead corporation in a quote
from the Delaware case of Frederic G. Kapf & Son v. Gorson.°3
The latter case stated that "[flailure to pay franchise taxes is an
issue solely between the corporation and the State since the
franchise tax statutes are for revenue-raising purposes alone. This
being so, if the creditor dealt in good faith with the corporation as
a corporation, and f no fraud or bad faith on the part of the
199. Id at 1284-85.
200. Id at 1285.
201. Id at 1286-87. It is perhaps significant that California's statutes also confer a broad
discretion on the Secretary of State to revive even noncomplying corporations if that would enhance
the State's collection prospects. See supra note 39 (discussing CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 23305(b)).
This statute supports the view that, as in the Dominion Oi case, the main purpose of California's
scheme is to collect taxes, not to promote the interests of private litigants. See supra notes 192-96
and accompanying text (discussing Dominion Oil). As stated in Peacock Hil once that purpose is
served, there is little reason to assess additional penalties. Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon
Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369, 371, 503 P.2d 285, 286, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 30 (1972).
202. Barker-Chadsey, 448 N.E.2d at 1287 n.15.
203. 243 A.2d 713, 715 (Del. 1968).
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corporate officers is involved, the creditor's remedy is against the
corporation." 4
A number of principles relevant to the retroactive validation
problem are discussed in Spector v. Hart," a Florida appellate
court affirmed a decision which the lower court's validation of a
lease executed by a dissolved corporation's president on its behalf
during the period of suspension where the corporation had later
been revived. 6 The revival restored the corporate status and
allowed the president to win summary judgment on the claim
against him for personal liability on the lease.20 7
The Spector court relied on a number of authorities 8
reasoning that: (1) The "acts and doings" of a corporation during
suspension of its corporate powers are "confirmed" by its
subsequent revival; (2) a corporation is treated as a de facto
corporation while suspended but still subject to revival;209 (3)
penalties for franchise tax delinquency are simply designed to
produce revenue and that reinstatement is "usually permitted nunc
pro tunc upon payment of the tax arrears; ' 10  and (4)
"restoration shall have effect ab initio from date of
dissolution., 21 ' The court also quoted a leading New Jersey case
reasoning in part that "[I]n good conscience the defendants, who
are strangers to the dealings between plaintiff and the State, should
not be allowed to take advantage of the plaintiff's default in paying
its taxes to escape their own obligations to the plaintiff, when its
default has been cured by its subsequent compliance with the
204. Barker-Chadsey Co., 448 N.E.2d at 1287 n.16.
205. 139 So. 2d 923 (Fla. App. 1962).
206. Id. at 923-24.
207. Id at 924. The specific Florida statute then in effect provided in part that "restoration
shall be effective from the date of dissolution or cancellation of permit." Id at 924-25 (citing
FLORIDA STAT. ANN. § 608.37(1) (West 1977)).
208. Id. at 925-26.
209. Id. at 925. The court cited the annotation at 13 A.L.L 2d 1220 (1950), which has been
superseded by 42 A.I.L 4th 392 (1985). Id.
210. Id. at (citing 2 HoRNsmRIn, CORPORATION LAW AND PRAICE § 812, at 354 (1959)).
211. Id. at 926 (citing McClung v. Hill 96 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1938)).
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statutory requirements." 21 2 The current Florida revivor statute at
least implicitly provides for retroactive\validation of interim
acts.2
13
Relevant to this Article's hypotheticals, the effectiveness of a
non-litigation, non-contact act--transfer of a deed--was discussed in
New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co. v. Virgil & Frank's Locker
Services, Inc.,a a diversity case applying Missouri law to an
insurance company is appeal of a judgment in favor of the insured
corporation.2"5 The corporation sued on its fire insurance policy
after its building was destroyed by fire.216 Prior to the fire, the
corporation's charter was forfeited for failure to file required
antitrust affidaits. 217 In the interim between the forfeiture and its
rescission, the corporation executed a deed purporting to convey
title to the insured building to the holders of an existing deed of
trust."' After the building burned down, the corporation
submitted proofs of loss; these were rejected, and the forfeiture was
subsequently rescinded.21 9 In a twist on the usual scenario, the
212. Id at 927 (citing UB. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind, 70 A.2d 72 (NJ. 1949)). This rationale,
which is basically that as to third party corporate opponents the assertion of "rights" stemming from
a corporate suspension is a hypertechnical argument the courts would prefer not to deal with, was
expressed in Barker-Chadsey Co. v. W.C. Fuller Co., Inc, 448 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 n.16 (Mass. App.
1983), and Frederic G. Knapf & Son v. Gorson, 243 A.2d 713, 715 (Del. 1968).
213. FuL STAT. ANN. § 607.1422(3) (West Supp. 1992) ("When the reinstatement is effective,
it relates back to and takes effect as of the effective date of the administrative dissolution and the
corporation resumes carrying on its business as if the administrative dissolution had never
occurred." ). Spector's specific holding was temporarily superseded by Florida legislation specifying
that (1) persons assuming without authority to act as a corporation are personally liable for resulting
liabilities, and (2) reinstatement of an involuntarily dissolved corporation has no effect on the
personal liability of corporate agents for actions taken during dissolution. See Anderson V.
Hillsborough Sheet Metal, Inc., 513 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. App. 1987) (affirming summary judgment
holding corporate president personally liable on contract with plaintiff entered while corporation
involuntarily dissolved for failure to file annual report). The statutes were revised again in 1989,
however, and now provide that in order to be held personally liable, persons acting on behalf of a
corporation must have actual notice of the administrative dissolution and that such liability is
terminated upon ratification of the action taken by the corporation's directors or shareholders
subsequent to dissolution. 18 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1421(4) (West Supp. 1992).
214. 302 F.2d 780 (8th Cir. 1962).
215. IL at 781.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 782.
219. Id at 781-82.
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principal argument the opposing party (the insurer) advanced on
appeal was that the transfer of the deed in question was an effective
interim act and the corporation therefore had no insurable
220interest.
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling that the
deed was void despite the rescission of the forfeiture.221 The
relevant Missouri statute then governing forfeiture of corporate
rights had been construed to effect a complete dissolution, making
the corporation a non-entity. The court noted: "It is elementary
that purported acts of a non-entity are without legal effect and that
a corporation['s] deed, executed while the corporation has no legal
existence, is a worthless thing."' It then reasoned that the
subsequent rescission of the forfeiture was not retroactive because
the relevant statute did not evidence a clear legislative intent to
defeat the general rule that statutes operate prospectively only."2
In Bar Bea Truck Leasing Co., Inc. v. United States,225 a
leading case in the relevant area of non-contract, non-litigation
interim acts, the United States Court of International Trade applied
New Jersey law and rejected the government's contention that a
corporation's suspension while it held a Customhouse license
(CHL) caused the license to permanently expire despite the
corporation's subsequent revivor.2 6 The court relied on the
220. Id at 781.
221. Id. at 780.
222. Id at 783.
223. Id
224. Id at 783-84. 1his case is discussed mainly because it contravenes the apparent majority
rule and its reasoning is quite similar to that of the Ransome-Crummey court. See supra text
accompanying notes 50-75 (discussing Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393,205
P. 446 (1922)).
Although factually analogous to the extent it involved the validity of an interim act not strictly
within the litigation or contract context (i.e., conveying real property by deed), New Hampshire Fire
is also distinguishable from our hypotheticals because (1) it involved a complete forfeiture and
dissolution, rather than a mere suspension, and (2) California courts have already construed the
relevant California revivor statutes to have substantial retroactive reach without apparent regard for
the rules concerning the prospective operation of statutes generally. Most importantly, as discussed
further below, non-retroactivity is no longer the law in Missouri, having been legislatively abrogated.
See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
225. 546 F. Supp. 558 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, 713 F.2d 1563
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
226. Id at 558-59.
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leading decision of JB. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkindc in expounding
the New Jersey rule "that the reestablishment of a repealed
corporation when the unpaid taxes (which caused the revocation)
are paid, is retroactive and validates all prior acts of the corporation
during the period the corporate charter was null and void.' '2
The effects and policies (suspension and revenue raising,
respectively) of the New Jersey and California statutory schemes,
as interpreted by those states' highest courts, are the same. 9 The
reasoning of the Wolfe case is still cited as persuasive by many
newer cases,20 and Wole was decided under a "Type 1" (i.e.,
silent) statutory scheme,"' also analogous to California's scheme.
Of particular interest is the following language in Wolfe:
The object of these [suspension and revivor] statutes being
solely the raising of revenue for the State (the police
aspects of the situation being covered by separate statutory
provisions hereinafter referred to), it would be inequitable
to permit third persons, such as the defendants here, who
227. 70 A.2d 72 (NJ. 1949).
228. Bea Bar Truck Leasing, 546 F. Supp. at 563. The court further stated:
In Wolfe, plaintiffs sued to recover a commission, and defendant resisted on the ground
that plaintiffs' corporate charter had been revoked seven years earlier. The unanimous
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the effect of repeal was mere suspension of corporate
powers until the corporation has complied with the revenue raising provisions of the
statute. "[W]hen default has been cured by subsequent compliance... reinstatement
relates back to the date of the proclamation [of repeal] and validates corporate action
taken in the interim." [70 A.2d at 76]
Id,
229. See Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 CaL 3d 369,503 P.2d 285, 105
Cal. Rptr. 29 (1972).
230. See, e.g., supra notes 212, 228-29; infra note 231 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 178 (explaining a "Type I" statutory scheme). Of Wolfe, it has been
noted:
The relevant statute in that case provided that the power granted by law to a corporation
would be "'inoperative and void" if the corporation did not pay its State taxes. Upon
payment of delinquent taxes, the corporation would be reinstated "and entitled to all its
franchises and privileges."... ITIhe New Jersey statute did not indicate whether
reinstatement would relate back to the date of dissolution and validate corporation action
taken daring the interim.
Regal Package liquor v. LR.D., Inc., 466 N.E.2d 409, 411 (1984) (emphasis added). While it is
noteworthy as well, in light of this article's third hypothetical, that Salkind validated a brokerage
commission agreement involving a corporate broker, no argument was made there that a license was
necessary and/or defective (it was a personal, not real property brokerage contract), only that the
contract was void. Wolfe, 70 A.2d at 73-75.
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had dealt with the corporation in the period when its charter
had been forfeited to defend suits against them on this
ground after the corporation had... been reinstated as a
corporation and entitled to all its franchises and privileges.
In good conscience the defendants, who are strangers to the
dealings between plaintiff and the state, should not be
allowed to escape their own obligations to the plaintiff,
when its default has been cured by its subsequent
compliance with the statutory requirements. [T] Nor does
this view leave the State without adequate remedies against
a corporation that persists in exercising its corporate powers
despite the Governor's proclamation of repealer for the
nonpayment of taxes. 2
The Wolfe court went on to note that the State's remedies
included statutory provisions making it a misdemeanor to exercise
a suspended corporation's powers." Additionally, the statutes
grant the attorney general authority to petition to obtain a receiver
for the corporation, or to obtain and execute a judgment on the
taxes due. 4
Turning to an out-of-state decision which is factually similar to
the first hypothetical, in Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell,235 the Idaho
Court of Appeals, vacating and remanding for further proceedings,
rejected various attacks by an individual (Bell) on a corporation's
ownership of four unpatented mining claims.26 Bell claimed that
she had contract rights to the disputed clains, that the corporation
had abandoned or forfeited them, and that she had then
"relocated" the mining claims.z 7 State law required the
performance and proof of annual labor by a claim's record owner
to protect it from such competing claims based on relocation.238
232. Wolfe, 70 A.2d at 76.
233. Id.
234. Id at 76-77.
235. 678 P.2d 72 (Idaho App. 1984). This case is nearly identical to, and inspired, this Article's
first hypothetical.
236. Id. at 74.
237. Id.
238. Id at 77.
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Among Bell's many assertions was a "technical attack" based
on the fact that the corporation's charter had been forfeited for
approximately two years for failure to file annual statements.239
Obviously, if the corporation's revivor did not retroactively validate
the required annual labor on its behalf, the claim was forfeited and
subject to relocation. Without belaboring the point, the court simply
stated: "[T]his temporary forfeiture of the corporate charter did
not, of itself, result in forfeiture of the mining claims." 2"
Golden Condor recognizes retroactive validation of interim acts
outside the contract and litigation contexts, and would resolve this
Article's first hypothetical if controlling. Moreover, Golden
Condor's result was reached by following a case decided under
statutory language very similar to California's "without prejudice"
proviso.24
1
Illustrating a contrary view of the retroactive effect of revivor
in a non-litigation, non-contract factual context is Giselmann v.
Stegeman,242 a decision which, without extended discussion, held
void the issuance of capital stock authorized by a corporation's
board of directors after its charter was forfeited for failure to renew
its registration and antitrust affidavits.243 That case was decided
under a no longer effective "Type 1" statute construed as not
retroactively validating interim acts.2' The court held the
rescinding of the forfeiture did not validate the illegal meetings and
elections leading to the stock issuance.245 As previously indicated,
239. Id. at 78.
240. I& To support this point, the court cited Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co. v. Rivers, 398
P.2d 63 (Idaho 1964), a case holding that the temporary loss of a corporate charter does not cause
the loss of its trade name. Id.
241. See infra note 281 and accompanying text (setting forth the text of then-effective Idaho
statute and discussing its relevant language's similarity to California's "without prejudice" proviso).
The relevant statute, IDAHO CODE § 30-608 (1980), was repealed as part of an entire chapter effective
in 1981. Effective July 1, 1981, and continuing in effect to the present day, is the provision contained
in IDAHO CODE § 30-1-138 (1992), which provides simply that "[fjrom and after the granting of the
reinstatement, the corporation's powers and authority to do business shall be restored."
242. 443 S.W.2d 127, 135-36 (Mo. 1969).
243. Id. at 132, 135.
244. Id. at 131-32, 137.
245. Id. at 135; see John P. Ludington, Annotation, Corporate Charter Reinstatement, 42
A.L.R. 4th § 8, at 410-11 (1985) (discussing statutes which do not retroactively validate interim acts).
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the result, however, would be different today under a change in
Missouri law.246
More typical of the usual result in the context of non-litigation,
noncontract interim acts is the decision in Greenville Law Library
Association v. Village of Ansonia," in which the Ohio Court of
Common Pleas held that the nearly eight year cancellation of a law
library association's corporate charter had "no adverse effect" on
its statutory right to funds created from certain fines collected by
municipal corporations in the same county. 8  The court
concluded that because the library continued its operation and
functioning the same as it had prior to the cancellation of its
charter, and the same as it had done since reinstatement, the
library's right to receive funds as a county library association
should not be denied.249
The above cases illustrate varying approaches in different
jurisdictions and the importance of the relevant statutory language,
as well as its case law interpretation, in each jurisdiction. Stock
Pot,2 50  Barker-Chadsey,25 ' and Spector,252  illustrate a broad,
retroactively-validating nunc pro tune approach, retroactively
validating contracts, trademark rights, and steps in litigation. The
Barker-Chadsey court, took into account the apparent presence or
absence of good faith on the part of the corporation and its agents,
and the Spector court recognized that nonpayment of corporate
taxes commonly inadvertently occurs. 3 Attribution of a good
246. See infra note 257 and accompanying text.
247. 275 N.E.2d 883 (Ohio Comm. Pl. 1971), rev'don other grounds, 292 N.E. 2d 880 (1973).
Ohio's statutory suspension and revivor scheme is not a model of clarity, but has apparently been
interpreted to retroactively validate interim acts upon a corporation's reviver. See infra note 301.
248. Id. at 888.
249. RE
250. 737 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
251. 448 N.E.2d 1283 (Mass. App. 1983).
252. 139 So. 2d 923 (Fla. App. 1962).
253. See Barker-Chadsey, 448 N.E.2d at 1287 n.16; Spector, 139 So.2d at 927 (considering
good faith of corporate officers). With respect to the potential for an inadvertent tax payment lapse
in California, see supra note 24. It further appears that courts seem more willing to employ a
retroactive validation approach where the policy of the suspension and revivor statutes is, as in
California, merely to ensure payment of taxes, not levy punitive sanctions. The presence of punitive,
penalizing statutory provisions, however, can even be construed to support a retroactive revivor
analysis, as demonstrated by the Wolfe court. See., e.g., J.B. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind, 70 A.2d 72, 76
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faith forgetfulness to delinquent corporations is conducive to
interpretations finding revivor to operate retroactively; as stated by
one sympathetic court, "A large number of corporations . . .
overlook the payment of taxes and the filing of various required
forms with the Secretary of State. ' 2 54
Examples of other states' generally liberal revival rules provide
evidence of a trend in that direction.25 5 In summarizing the
results of the reported cases dealing with roughly similar factual
situations to those of this article's hypotheticals, the trend appears
to be to retroactively validate the interim acts of a suspended
corporation, at least where there is no judicial authority interpreting
a silent statute as not operating in such retroactive fashion. 6 It
is interesting to note that the only factually similar cases discussed
which do not uphold retroactive validation of the interim acts apply
Missouri law based on judicial interpretation which was
subsequently superseded by that state's legislature in order to effect
retroactive validation of interim acts."
(1949) (provision making unauthorized exercise of suspended corporation's powers a misdemeanor
held to be one of the State's many adequate remedies against suspended corporation and to support
retroactive revivor because additional "police aspects" are not needed).
254. Spector, 139 So. 2d at 927. This seems especially possible in California, given the history
of ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding the statutory provisions addressing notice of suspension.
See supra note 26.
255. See, e.g., A.ILD.C, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 619 S.W.2d 843 (Mo. App. 1981)
(holding corporation's cause of action not barred by five-year statute of limitations where period
expired after suit filed but before rescission of forfeiture of corporation's charter, filing of petition
and issuance of summons tolled running of limitations period, and once recision was issued, all acts
of corporation, including filing of suit, were confirmed and held to be valid acts of corporation);
Sandleitner v. Sadur & Pelland, 504 A.2d 672 (Md. 1985) (holding corporate officer not liable for
legal fees incurred following forfeiture of corporate charter for failure to pay taxes where corporate
charter subsequently revived; statute provided that revival validates all contracts or other acts done
in name of corporation while charter was void); Kerney v. Cobb, 658 S.W.2d 128 (Tenn. App. 1983)
(concluding that in providing for reinstatement of corporate charter, legislature intended to validate
corporation's privileges and existence from date of revocation and holding stockholder had no right
to partition real estate to which corporation held title following reinstatement of corporate charter
previously revoked for nonpayment of taxes).
256. See infra notes 297-302 and accompanying text (providing examples of courts interpreting
silent statutes as retroactively validating interim acts of suspended corporations).
257. See A.RD.C., 619 S.W.2d at 845-46 (prior holdings abrogated by Missouri legislature's
1975 statutory amendment which "declared in express terms that the restoration of corporate rights
and privileges has retroactive effect and is effective from the date of forfeiture"). The trend in
Missouri is typical, prior to the statury changes. Missouri was apparently one of only a handful of
jurisdictions which has taken the "non-retroactivity" position, and that minority group seems to be
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B. Results Under Similar Statutes
In a broad sense, California's suspension and revivor statutes
are similar to those of a large group of jurisdictions whose statutes
the Corporate Charter Reinstatement annotation classifies as
"silent as to intervening acts,"" and whose courts have taken
the view that reinstatement retroactively validates interim acts."
In a number of cases decided within this group, several principles
and lines of thought consistently emerge as supporting rationales:
dwindling; the trends therein are away from non-retroactivity, or toward a weaker version of it. The
Corporate Charter Reinstatement annotation somewhat inaccurately lists the following six
jurisdictions as having case law construing "Type 1- statutes as not validating interim acts:
Arkansas, the District of Columbia, Missouri. New York, Oklahoma and Oregon. John P. Ludington,
Annotation, Corporate Charter Reinstatement, 42 A.LR. 4th 392 § 5[b], at 408-09 (1985). Even this
small list is highly questionable if deemed to refer to any general rule. The Missouri non-retroactivity
rule, as noted above, was legislatively abrogated. New York case law holds that interim acts,
including contracts, are validated by reinstatement. See Bowditch v. 57 Laight Street Corp., 111 Misc.
2d 255, 257,443 N.Y.S. 2d 785,788 (1981); infra text accompanying notes 323-27. Moreover, while
the minority view of non-retroactivity appears well entrenched in Arkansas and the District of
Columbia, the sole Oklahoma case cited by the annotation involved an interim contract and was
decided under a statute expressly making such contracts voidable. State Dep't of Highways v. Martin,
572 P.2d 611,614 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977). Furthermore, the annotation itself notes there is retroactive
validation under Oklahoma law. Also cited in the annotation were R.V. McGinnis Theaters v. Video
Independent Theaters, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 607, 613 (N.D. Okla. 1967), cerr denied, 390 U.S. 1014
(1968), and J.D. Simmons, Inc. v. Alliance Corp., 79 F.R.D. 547, 548 (W.D. Okla. 1978). The
Oregon case cited, while recognizing a rule of non-retroactivity (apparently under a prior decision's
dictum), also sanctions the application of the doctrines of ratification and estoppel under equitable
principles to validate such acts, at least under some circumstances. High v. Davis, 584 P.2d 725, 729-
30 (Or. 1978). The Corporate Charter Reinstatement annotation might well have added Michigan to
its list. See Stoneleigh Homes, Inc. v. Jerome Bldg. Co., 188 N.W.2d 152, 157-56 (Mich. Ct. App.
1971) (concluding statute prohibits enforcement of interim contracts by corporation). Even California,
for that matter, may have been added, because the states listed (probably among many others) also
somewhat limit corporate enforcement of interim contracts, but this would ultimately be misleading
because interim contracts are treated differently than other interim acts in California and elsewhere.
Numerous California and Michigan authorities amply demonstrate that the general rule in both states
would appear to be that reinstatement validates interim acts, although obviously in California the rule
is far from clear in many important contexts. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 7-161.
258. John. P. Ludington, Annotation, Corporate Charter Reinstatement, 42 A.LR. 4th 392 §
5[a], at 406-07 (1985); id. § 22[b], at 11 (Supp. 1992). But see supra note 7 (discussing California
Revenue and Tax Code § 23305.1(c)(1)(B)).
259. See infra notes 298-302 (providing examples of jurisdictions with silent states whose
courts have concluded reinstatement validates interim acts).
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1. The issue of corporate capacity is one solely between
the taxpayer and the state, and not the concern of third
parties who are strangers to their dealings;
2 °
2. A general rule of non-retroactivity would cast doubt on
all business transactions and create an undesirable void
in the corporate existence;2
61
3. A rule of non-retroactivity would unjustly benefit third
parties by permitting them to escape their obligations,
especially where these parties deal with corporations as
valid corporations;262
4. Statutes making exercise of a suspended corporation's
powers a criminal misdemeanor, exacting monetary
penalties, and limiting enforcement of contracts are
sufficient and adequate penalties and, once a corporation
had paid its taxes for its delinquent years, actions taken
during those years should also be upheld;263 and
5. Persons dealing with corporations are charged with
knowledge that corporate acts invalid when done may
later be validated by revival.
26
All of these principles support the fullest possible extension and
application of the general rule of retroactive validation of interim
acts.
Under a stricter criterion of statutory similarity, the inquiry
must focus on other state courts' interpretation of language
260. J.B. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind, 70 A.2d 72, 76 (NJ. 1949).
261. Stutzman Feed Serv, Inc. v. Todd & Sargent, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 417, 418 (S.D. Iowa
1972). This is a compelling rationale when its consequences are fully pondered. Unless the purpose
of the suspension is to punish at the state's expense and for the benefit of private parties, a flood of
litigation challenging all business transactions and interim acts should not be encouraged.
262. Wolfe, 70 A.2d at 76. This rationale could be augmented by noting that a rule of non-
retroactively could also provide non-contracting third parties with unjust windfalls in disputes with
corporations totally unrelated to the suspension.
263. See, e.g., Joseph A. Holpuch Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 560, 563 (Ct. Cl. 1945)
("It would be inequitable for the State to collect taxes levied on the privilege of doing business as
a corporation and at the same time deny to the corporation the right to exercise the privilege. So
when it accepted payment of taxes in default together with penalties, and set aside the dissolution
decree, we think it intended to validate the exercise of the corporate franchise in the years for which
the taxes were paid.").
264. See, e.g., Held v. Crosthwaite, 260 F. 613, 616-17 (2d Cir. 1919).
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substantially similar to the "without prejudice" proviso found in
California Revenue and Taxation section 23305a: "reinstatement
shall be without prejudice to any action, defense or right which has
accrued by reason of the original suspension or forfeiture[.]" Very
similar statutory language was involved in the Idaho statute
involved in Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company v.
Rivers." - Michigan's similar, but broader, statutory scheme was
discussed in Industrial Coordinators, Inc., v. Artco, Inc..2 Both
cases reached results of retroactive validation.
267
In Pacific Northwest Bell,2  cited as pertinent authority in the
factually similar Idaho case (Golden Condor) discussed above,269
the court held that a corporation whose charter was forfeited for
failure to pay its annual license tax did not lose the right to its
corporate name for that reason.27 The suspended corporation,
Hell's Canyon Excursions, Inc. (HCE), was incorporated by
Wilkins and Shaughnessy in 1956, and thereafter conducted Snake
River boat excursions.27 It ceased active river operations in
1960.272 At that time, Rivers, operator of another boat excursion
business called Rivers Navigation Company, started using the name
"Hell's Canyon Excursions" as well.273 He docked his boat
under a sign he obtained from Wilkins bearing that name. 4
265. 398 P.2d 63 (Idaho 1964). Quite similar language was also involved, but found not
pertinent to the issues in the case, in Manufacturers Acceptance Corp. v. Krusl, 438 P.2d 667, 673-
744 (Mont. 1968) (affirming summary judgment against assignee of accounts receivable of tax
delinquent foreign corporation under factoring agreement in action by assignee against contractors
who had levied on contract accounts before tax delinquencies were cured by assignee. The statute
provided: The revivor shall be without prejudice to any action, defense or right which occurred by
reason of the original suspension or forfeiture" and was not -germane" since it addressed issue of
right to do business while case involved different statutory disability concerning enforceability of
contracts). The statutory provisions referred to in ManufacturersAcceptance Corp. have been revised
and are presently codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-31-524 (1991).
266. 115 N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 1962).
267. Paciflc Northwest Bell, 398 P.2d at 67; Industrial Coordinators, 115 N.W.2d at 125.
268. 398 P.2d 63 (Idaho 1964).
269. See supra notes 235-41 and accompanying text.
270. Pacific Northwest Bell, 398 P.2d at 66.
271. Id. at 64.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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In 1961, one Harvey, pursuant to negotiations with Wilkdns
concerning purchase of the corporation, began making river trips
and using the name "Hell's Canyon Excursions." 275 In late 1962,
HCE's charter was forfeited for failure to pay the annual license
tax.276 Thereafter, and before HCE's subsequent reinstatement,
Rivers filed notice of an intent to incorporate under HCE's name
pursuant to Idaho Code section 30-107(3).277 In a declaratory
judgment action brought by the plaintiff telephone company to
determine Harvey's and Rivers' competing claims to the right to a
listing under HCE's name, the trial court held that HCE's
attempted reinstatement under its old name was void because
Rivers had already appropriated that name.278
The Idaho Supreme Court reversed, construing the corporate
name statutes to protect a suspended corporation's name, if not
already "adopted" by another corporation before reinstatement, as
fully as that of a non-suspended corporation.279 The court stated
that any other construction "would render the restorative provisions
of Idaho Code section 30-608 [Idaho's revivor statute]
ineffectual. ' 280 The latter statute bears striking similarities to
California's revivor statute with respect to its "without prejudice"
language.2
81
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id at 65.
279. Id. at 66.
280. Id
281. Id (describing the Idaho statute as providing that "[A]ny corporation which failed to pay
the license tax and penalty required by this chapter may pay all the said license taxes and penalties
prescribed by section 30-603, and the license taxes and penalties that would have accrued, if such
corporation had not forfeited its charter or right to do business, and any such corporation making
such payment shall be relieved from the forfeiture prescribed by this chapter ... provided, the
rehabilitation of the corporation under the provisions of this chapter shall be without prejudice to
any action, defense or right which accrued by reason of the originalforfeiture... provided, that in
case the name of any corporation which has suffered the forfeiture prescribed by this chapter has
been adopted by any other corporation since the date of said forfeiture, or a name which so closely
resembles the name of such corporation as it will tend to deceive, then said corporation, having
suffered said forfeiture, shall be relieved therefrom, pursuant to the terms of this section of this
chapter, only upon the adoption by said corporation seeking reinstatement of a new name. .
(emphasis added).
Pacific Law Journal IVol. 24
While the specific language dealing with the corporate name
was found dispositive on the facts of Pacific Northwest Bell, the
principles of that case were extended to Golden Condor's fact
situation even under a new statute impliedly sanctioning
nonretroactivity by providing that the corporation's powers will be
restored "[f]rom and after the granting of the reinstatement[.] ' 282
Clearly, whatever "rights" or "defenses" which may arguably
exist in Idaho post-revivor do not include the "right" to claim that
an unpatented mining claim is forfeited merely by operation of a
corporate suspension.
Michigan reached the same retroactively validating result under
its similar statute. In Industrial Coordinators, Inc. v. Artco,
Inc.,8 3 the plaintiff corporation sued the defendant during an
approximately twenty-five day period during which the plaintiff's
powers were suspended for failure to file an annual report.284 The
plaintiff promptly filed its report and paid the necessary fees, and
thereafter the defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground
that the plaintiff had no capacity to sue when it filed.285 The
relevant Michigan statute provided that the "penalties" imposed on
the corporation for failure to comply with the annual report
provisions are:
(a) Its powers shall be suspended thereafter, until it
shall file such report.
(b) It shall not maintain any action or suit in any court
of this State upon any contract entered into during
the time of such default.286
The trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss, and the
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed on appeal. 2 7 The court's
282. IDAHO CODE § 30-1-138(b)(1) (1992).
283. 115 N.W. 2d 123 (Mich. 1962).
284. Id. at 123.
285. Id. at 123-24.
286. Id. at 124; see infra notes 290-91 and accompanying text (discussing similarities between
Michigan and California statutes).
287. Industrial Coordinators, 115 N.W.2d at 124.
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discussion of the nature of the statutory suspension and its interplay
with the nature of corporate operations is illuminating:
The contrast between penalty (a) and penalty (b) is
significant. The statute flatly states that a contract entered
into during the period in default cannot be enforced by the
corporation in any court in the State of Michigan. This is a
specific, punitive provision. [citations] But while penalty (b)
deals with a single act of a corporation--entering into a
contract--penalty (a) is an all-inclusive reference to the
powers of a corporation. 8
The court thereafter discussed the Legislature's intention with
respect to the general penalty (a), seemingly employing a "plea in
abatement" analysis:
The suspension here intended is to deny to the corporation
the benefit of the use of its powers until the default is
cured. So, a corporation cannot carry on a suit while it is in
default if the defense is raised [citation], but once the
default has been corrected, there is no bar to the action.
[citation] [1] .. [D]efendant states that plaintiff can reinstate
its suit if defendant's motion is granted. But this would
further discommode third parties and necessitate a second
journey through the court. [ ] ... [Tihe defense of failure
to comply having not been. . raised by the defendant
288. Id The court explained:
The powers of a corporation are many-the power to sue and to be sued; the power to
deed real estate; the power to carry on a business, etcetera. Furthermore, corporate activity
consists of a flow of many acts, some beginning, some ending, and some in process at a
given instant A corporation hires, fires, manufactures, trades, sells, and engages in
corporate activities until such time as the suspension is invoked. In this connection,
Turner v. Western Hydro-Electro Co., 241 Mich. 6, 216 N.W. 476 [1927], is of interest
for holding that the failure to pay fees does not cancel the charter even though the statute
under consideration in that case declared the charter to be "absolutely void." The court
said that such a provision is not self executing and that a judicial inquiry would be
required in order to forfeit the corporate charter.
Id.
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[before revival], was no longer available. The suspension
of plaintiff's corporate powers was at an end." 9
The Michigan statutory suspension and revivor scheme is
broadly similar to California's. California has a similar, though
much less harsh, "specific punitive provision" regarding contracts,
and its statutes also provide for a general suspension of corporate
powers by "an all-inclusive reference to the powers of a
corporation.""29 It can certainly be argued that if the California
Legislature had any other specific punitive sanctions of
nonretroactivity or additional prerequisites for validation in mind,
it would have spelled them out just as it did with the contract
provisions.91 The Michigan court's reasoning that a contrary
construction would defeat the statute's curative purpose, adversely
impact third parties, and waste judicial resources is equally
applicable in California.
289. Id at 125 (emphasis added).
290. Id The 1990 revisions to California's statutes now also specify that, among other things,
suspended corporations are "not ... entitled to sell, transfer, or exchange real property . CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 23302(d) (West 1992).
291. See CAL REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 23304.1, 23304.5, 23305.1 (West 1992).
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C. Trends in Important States
Among the states whose statutes expressly validate interim acts
are Delaware,2  Illnois,293  Maryland,294  Massachusetts,
295
292. 4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 312(a)-(c), (g) (1991) (the statute provides for extension,
restoration, renewal or revival of the certificate of incorporation [i.e., corporate charter] of a
corporation for which the same has become inoperative by law for nonpayment of taxes is
accomplished by payment of all franchise taxes and penalties due as of the cerificate's forfeiture).
Except for ability to use its former corporate name where another corporation has adopted a virtually
indistinguishable name during the forfeiture, U£ § 312(f) (1991), the revivor is expressly complete
and plenary:
Upon the filing of the certificate in accordance with § 103 of this title, the corporation
shall be renewed and revived with the same force and effect as if its certificate of
incorporation had not been forfeited pursuant to subsection (c) of § 136 of this title, or
inoperative and void, or had not expired by limitation. Such reinstatement shall validate
all contracts, acts, matters and things made, done and performed within the scope of its
certificate of incorporation by the corporation, its officers and agents during the time when
its certificate of incorporation was forfeited pursuant to subsection (c) of § 136 of this
title, or was inoperative or void, or after its expiration by limitation, with the same force
and effect and to all intents and purposes as if the certificate of incorporation had at all
times remained in full force and effect. All real and personal property, rights and credits,
which belonged to the corporation at the time its certificate of incorporation become
forfeited pursuant to subsection (c) of § 136 of this title, or inoperative or void, or expired
by limitation and which were not disposed of prior to the time of its revival or renewal
shall be vested in the corporation, after its revival and renewal, as fully and amply as they
were held by the corporation at and before the time its certificate of incorporation became
forfeited pursuant to subsection (c) of § 136 of this itle, inoperative or void, or expired
by limitation, and the corporation after its renewal and revival shall be as exclusively
liable for all contracts, acts, matters and things made, done or performed in its name and
on its behalf by its officers and agents prior to its reinstatement, as if its certificate of
incorporation had at all times remained in full force and effect.
L. § 312(e) (1991).
293. See infra notes 305-14 and accompanying text (discussing Illinois law).
294:. For Maryland law concerning corporate forfeiture and revival for tax delinquency, see
generally MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & AsS'Ns §§ 3-305-3-519 (Supp. 1992). The revival provision
states:
The reinstatement and extension of a corporation's existence under § 3-501 of this subtitle
or the revival of a corporation's charter under § 3-507 of this subtitle has the following
effects:
(1) If otherwise done within the scope of its charter, all contracts or other acts done in the
name of the corporation while the charter was void are validated, and the corporation is
liable for them;
(2) All the assets and rights of the corporation, except those sold or those of which it was
otherwise divested while the charter was void, are restored to the corporation to the same
extent that they were held by the corporation before the expiration or forfeiture of the
charter.
Id § 3-512 (Supp. 1992); see Arnold Developer v. Collins, 567 A.2d 949, 952 (Md. 1990)
(recognizing "clear legislative intent to be that the revival of a corporate charter relates back to the
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and Pennsylvania.296 Among the states reaching the same result
with silent or unclear statutes are California (arguably),297
Michigan,298  New Jersey,299  New York,30°  Ohio,3° 1  and
date of the forfeiture,]" and "that all of the powers, authority, rights and assets of the corporation
at the time its charter was forfeited are vested in the corporation, after the revival, as fully as they
were enjoyed and held at the time of the forfeiture, except as to those rights and assets of which the
corporation was divested prior to the revivaL") (citations omitted).
It should be noted that the Maryland scheme provides for a misdemeanor penalty and $500 ime
for any person transacting business on behalf of a corporation whose charter has been forfeited and
that, absent evidence clearly to the contrary, a corporate officer or director is presumed to know of
the forfeiture. MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs & ASS'NS § 3-514(a)-(b) (Supp. 1992). However, a
prosecution for violation of the section cannot be begun after articles of revival are filed. Id § 3-
514(c) (Supp. 1992).
295. The Massachusetts revival statutes provide in pertinent part:
[U]pon the filing of a certificate reviving a corporation for all purposes, said corporation
shall stand revived with the same powers, duties and obligations as if it had not been
dissolved, except as otherwise provided in said certificate; and all acts and proceedings
of its officers, directors and stockholders or members, acting or purporting to act as such,
which would have been legal or valid but for such dissolution, shall, except as aforesaid
stand ratified and confirmed ....
25 MASS. GEn. LAws ANN. ch. 155, § 56 (West 1992) (relative to all corporations); see id ch. 156B,
§ 108 (West 1992) (substantially identical provisions relating to business corporations); see also
Stock Pot Restaurant, Inc. v. Stockpot, Inc., 737 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Barker-Chadsey
Co. v. W.C. Fuller Co., Inc., 448 N.E.2d 1283, 1284 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (applying chapter 156B,
§ 108); see also John P. Ludington, Annotation, Corporate Charter Reinstatement, 42 A.L.R. 4th 392
§ 3, at 403-04 (1985).
296. Pennsylvania's recently enacted revivor statute, which adds a "new procedure" according
to the committee comment following it, provides in pertinent part:
(a) General Rule - Any business corporation whose charter or articles have been forfeited
... or whose corporate existence has expired by reason of any limitation contained in its
charter or articles and the failure to effect a timely renewal or extension of its corporate
existence, may at any time by filing a statement of revival procure a revival of its charter
or articles, together with all the rights, franchises, privileges and immunities and subject
to all of its duties, debts and liabilities that had been vested in and imposed upon the
corporation by its charter or article as last in effect.
(c) Filing and Effect - Upon the filing of the statement of revival, the corporation shall
be revived with the same effect as if its charter or articles had not been forfeited or
expired by limitation. The revival shall validate all contracts and other transactions made
and effected within the scope of the articles of the corporation by its representatives
during the time when its charter or articles were forfeited or expired to the same effect
as its charter or articles had not been forfeited or expired.
15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1341 (1989).
297. See supra notes 37-115 and accompanying text.
298. Michigan has statutes proving for (1) forfeiture of all a corporation's "corporate or
chartered rights and privileges" for failure to pay any overdue taxes within a certain period after
execution and levy on corporate property produce insufficient revenues to pay the same, MICH.
COM1p. LAws ANN. § 207.442 (West 1986), and for (2) automatic corporate dissolution (for Iwo
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years' annual report or filing fee defaults), or revocation of its certificate of authority (for one year's
defaults), /L § 450.1922 (West 1990). Under the last-cited statutory scheme, "[u]pon compliance...
the rights of the corporation shall be the same as though a dissolution or revocation had not taken
place, and all contracts entered into and other rights acquired during the interval shall be valid and
enforceable." Id. § 450.1925(2) (West 1990); see Industrial Coordinators, Inc. v. Artco, Inc., 115
N.W.2d 123 (Mich. 1962); Michigan Rural Dev., Inc. v. El Mar Hills Resort, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 733
(Mich. CL App. 1971); see also Cardinal-Franklin Collections, Ltd. v. Department of Licensing and
Regulation, 443 N.W. 2d 176 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (although corporate collection agency was
dissolved for failure to file annual reports at time it petitioned to quash subpena of its records, upon
its subsequent compliance with statutory requirements it had standing and dissolution was to be
treated as if it had not taken place), appeal deniet4 Grossberg v. Cardinal-Franklin Collections, Inc.,
433 Mich. 912 (1989). Under the first-cited statutory scheme, dealing with taxes, there are no
apparent revivor provisions, probably because the scheme presumes al! of a corporation's property,
whether real or personal, has already been sold, making revivor somewhat pointless in that case.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 207.1 (West 1986).
299. See supra notes 227-34 and accompanying text (discussing J.B. Wolfe, Inc. v. Salkind,
70 A.2d 72 (NJ. 1949)); see also 54 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 54:11-5 (West 1992) (providing that upon
reinstatement, formerly tax-delinquent corporation is "entitled to all its franchises and privileges");
Ticketron, Division of Control Data Corp. v. Record Museum, Inc., 92 F.R.D. 6, 7 (1981) (granting
motion to reopen default judgment on the issue of whether reinstatement of a corporate charter
suspended for tax delinquency presented meritorious defense, stating "it is arguable that reinstatement
[under the New Jersey statute] related back to the date of the proclamation of repealer, validating
corporate action taken in the interim" and citing Wolfe, 370 A.2d 72, 76, Higi v. Elm Tree Village,
274 A.2d 845, 848 (1971) and Malavasi v. Villaseehin, 163 A.2d 214, 216 (1960)).
300. For New York's statutory scheme of dissolution and charter forfeitures of corporations
delinquent in paying corporation or franchise taxes, see 59 N.Y. TAX LAw §§ 203-9 (McKinney 1986
& Supp. 1991) (corporation tax); id. § 217 (McKinney 1986) (franchise tax). The publication of the
Secretary of State's proclamation declaring such dissolution and forfeiture has the effect of dissolving
the tax delinquent corporations without further proceedings, but the revivor provisions provides in
pertinent part that:
Any corporation so dissolved may file in the department of state a certificate of the tax
commission that all franchise taxes, penalties and interest charges accrued against it have
been paid. The filing such certificate shall have the effect of annulling all of the
proceedings theretofore taken for the dissolution of such corporation under the provisions
of this section and it shall thereupon have such corporate powers, rights, duties and
obligations as it had on the date of the publication of the proclamation, with the same
force and effect as if such proclamation had not been made or published ....
Id. § 203-a(3), (4), (7) (McKinney 1986 & Supp 1992); see Propp v. Charga Amusement Corp., 155
A.D.2d 251 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (corporate defendants' 1974 renewal of lease during period of
franchise tax delinquency was "retroactively validated" by defendant's 1987 reinstatement "to de
jure status, nunc pro tunc"); Lewis v. Schwartz, 119 A.D.2d 116, 506 (N.Y. 1984) (corporation's
payment of back taxes on property plus penalties restored it under Tax Law section 203-a(7) "to all
rights and obligations in existence on the date of the publication of the dissolution proclamation" and
revived right to redeem property from tax foreclosure proceeding); Bowditch v. 57 Laight St. Corp.,
443 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1981) (discussed infra at text accompanying notes 323-27).
301. Ohio's revivor statute states in pertinent part:
Any corporation whose articles of incorporation or license certificate to do or transact
business in this state has expired or has been canceled or revoked by the Secretary of
State as provided by law for failure to make any report or return or to pay any tax or fee,
upon payment to the Secretary of State of any additional fees and penalties required to
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Texas. 2 Other significant states reaching the same result include
Colorado, Tennessee and Washington. 3 Many of these states are
be paid to him, and upon the filing with the Secretary of State a certificate from the tax
commissioner that it has complied with all the requirements of law as to franchise or
excise tax reports and paid all franchise or excise taxes, fees or penalties due thereon for
every year of its delinquency, and upon the payment to the Secretary of State of an
additional fee of ten dollars, shall be reinstated and again entitled to exercise its rights,
privileges, and franchises in this state, and the Secretary of State shall cancel the entry of
cancellation or expiration to exercise its rights, privileges, and franchises ....
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5733.22 (Anderson 1991). The Ohio case law under this, and related and
predecessor statutes, indicates that in the interim between suspension and revivor a corporation is
considered a defacto corporation. See Goldstein Co. v. Mitchell, 14 Ohio App. 231, 233-34 (1921)
(statutory cancellation of charter "'is merely a measure for the purpose of collecting a revenue for
the state from corporations" which 'must be construed in connection with [section providing] that
upon the payment of the taxes ... and a penalty ... the entry of cancellation may be canceled and
set aside... [U]nder this state of the law and facts it is clear ... that the cancellation of the charter
amounted in effect only to a suspension of the corporation from its power to act until it had complied
with the provisions of [the section] authorizing the cancellation of the suspension of that power."
Thus, corporation was a defacto corporation during suspension and defendant having contracted in
error with it as such cannot raise its inability to act); see also GMS Management Co. v. Axe, 449
N.E.2d 43 (Ohio 1982) (regarding continued de jure existence of suspended corporation). Them
seems to be no authority directly on point, but the cases, especially Mitchell, suggest that section
5733.22 would retroactively validate any and all challenged interim acts.
302. Texas' silent statute provides:
A corporation whose charter or certificate of authority is forfeited under this chapter by
the Secretary of State is entitled to have its charter or certificate revived and to have its
corporate privileges revived ift
(1) the corporation files each report that is required by this chapter and that is
delinquent;
(2) the corporation pays the tax, penalty and interest that is imposed by this chapter
and that is due at the time the require under Section 171.313 of this code to set
aside forfeiture is made; and
(3) the forfeiture of the corporation's charter or certificate is set aside in a
proceeding under Section 171.313 of this code.
2 T x. TAx CODE ANN. § 171.312 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992). The case law construing this statutory
provision indicates that the revivor relates back and revives whatever rights the corporation previously
would have had, pursuant to the law's policy, which is not to punish corporations but to encourage
them to pay their taxes. See Bluebonnet Farms, Inc. v. Gibraltar Say. Ass'n, 618 S.W.2d 81 (Tox.
Civ. App. 1980); M & M Constr. Co., Inc. v. Great American Ins. Co., 747 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. CL
App. 1988) (concluding revivor is retroactive under the statute), cert. denied & appeal dismlssed, 493
U.S. 801 (1989).
303. See John. P. Ludington, Annotation, Corporate Charter Reinstatement, 42 A.LR. 4th 392
§ 5[a], at 406-07 (1985).
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usually considered to be important and prestigious "barometers"
in assessing legal trends.3
A brief discussion of the law in Illinois illustrates modem
judicial and legislative trends on the subject of validation of interim
acts. Under the Illinois suspension scheme, a corporation is subject
to "administrative dissolution" by the Secretary of State for failing
to pay its franchise taxes or file its annual report. 5 Such a
dissolution "terminates its corporate existence and such a dissolved
corporation shall not thereafter carry on any business .... .""
However, within a five year period following the date of issuance
of the certificate of dissolution, the corporation can be reinstated by
filing an application with the Secretary of State, filing all due
reports, paying all back fees and franchise taxes with penalties, and
obtaining a tax clearance letter from the Illinois Department of
Revenue.3" When the dissolved corporation has satisfied the
prerequisites for reinstatement, the Secretary of State must issue a
certificate of reinstatement,3"' and upon that issuance "the
corporate existence shall be deemed to have continued without
interruption from the date of the issuance of the certificate of
dissolution, and the corporation shall stand revived with such
powers, duties and obligations as if it had not been dissolved; and
all acts and proceedings of its officers, directors and shareholders,
acting or purporting to act as such, which would have been legal
and valid but for such dissolution, shall stand ratified and
confirmed. ' ' 3°' The language of this section, which became
effective July 1, 1984, is explicit and clear enough to resolve most
post-enactment questions regarding retroactive validation without
304. The process of selection of "'important states" is obviously subjective to a large extent.
Population and intangible prestige factors played a large part in the author's selection of the following
states (not including California) to survey for purposes of this portion of this Article: Delaware,
Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Texas.
For approximated populations and civil procedural systems of these states, see John B. Oakley &
Arthur P. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil
Procedure, 61 WASH L. REv. 1367, 1429 (1986) (Appendix, Table U1).
305. 32 ILL. ANN. STAT. § 12.40 (Smith-Hurd 1992).
306. Id. § 12.40(c) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
307. let § 12.45(a) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
308. IX § 12.45(c) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
309. Id. § 12.45(d) (Smith-Hurd 1992).
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litigation.31 Judicial interpretation of the law prior to this
clarifying legislation is also instructive on Illinois trends in this
area.
The Regal Package case, as the leading Illinois authority on the
subject of corporate dissolution and reinstatement (i.e., suspension
and revivor) both prior to and after enactment of the statutory
scheme discussed above, is also illuminating.11 The Regal
Package court held that a reinstated corporation could maintain a
forcible entry and detainer action filed when the corporation was
dissolved and based on a real estate installment contract entered
during dissolution, if the action was brought within certain time
limits. 312 The court cited statutory and case law allowing
dissolved corporations to institute actions within two years of
dissolution even if not reinstated before the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations, 313 and outside of two years
following dissolution if reinstated within the appropriate limitations
period.3 '
The court then addressed the "more difficult question" (not a
problem in California, or under Illinois' new statute) whether the
contract entered into during the period of corporate dissolution was
retroactively validated.1 ' Relying on the reasoning of J.B. Wolfe,
Inc. v. Salkind,316 and similar cases cited in a superseded
annotation on the subject,17 the court held that the contract was
310. Regal Package Liquor, Inc. v. J..., Inc., 466 N.E.2d 409,411-12 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id at 411. The court cited ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 32, para. 157.94 (1983), and Amman Food
& Liquor, Inc. v. Heritage Ins. Co., 382 N.E.2d 562 (IlL App. CL 1978). Id.
314. Kaybill Corp., Inc. v. Cheme, 320 N.E.2d 598, 603 (Ill. App. CL 1974).
315. Regal Package Liquor, 466 N.E.2d at 410. It Is interesting to note that the situations in
California and Illinois are in some respects completely transposed: In California, the statute of
limitations problem is not specifically addressed by statute and has generated confusion and bad law,
while in Illinois, that area is addressed in detail by statute. The contract situation, on the other hand,
a "difficult question" under Illinois* old statutory scheme, has long been specifically addressed by
statute in California. Despite this ironic factual juxtaposition of specific problem areas, the
comparison is nevertheless instructive with respect to legal analyses and reasoning concerning the
operation of revivor on interim acts.
316. 70 A.2d 72 (NJ. 1949).
317. See o. Van Ingen, Annotation, Reinstatement of Repeale4 Forfeitei Expired, or
Suspended Corporate Charter As Validating Acts In Interim, 13 A.L.R. 2d 1220 (1950).
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retroactively validated, and that in general the statutory
reinstatement scheme would relate back to validate such interim
contracts. 3 18 The Regal Package court observed that the New
Jersey statute at issue in Wolfe was similar to the old Illinois
statutory scheme, and "did not indicate whether reinstatement
would relate back to the date of dissolution and validate corporate
action taken during the interim. ' 319 Emphasizing that part of
Wolfe's rationale which looked to the purpose of the suspension
statutes (to raise revenue for the state) and the lack of nexus
between the party asserting them against the reinstated corporation,
on the one hand, and the dealings between the corporation and the
state on the other,320 the court noted:
The purpose of those provisions of the Business
Corporation Act of 1933 relating to corporate reports and
fees are for the benefit of the state and public. It would not
serve that purpose to allow those provisions to be used as
a defense to an action brought by a delinquent corporation
to enforce a contract. As a result, we decide that
reinstatement of a dissolved corporation.., relates back to
the date of dissolution, in general, so as to validate
corporate contacts entered into during the interim.321
Finally, the court observed, as noted above, that the problems of
statutory interpretation imposed by the case before it would not
have arisen under the newly enacted, but not then effective,
statutory scheme discussed above.' 2
A final example of pertinent legal thought on revivor in an
important state is found in the New York case of Bowditch v. 57
318. Regal Package Liquor, 446 N.E.2d at 411-12.
319. Id.
320. See i& (calling the objecting party a "stranger to the dealings").
321. hd at 412. The court also noted that the rule had exceptions, as for instance, where a
former officer attempts to use the reinstatement procedure to substitute worthless corporate liability
for valuable personal liability. Id (citing Estate of Plepel v. Industrial Metals, Inc., 450 N.F.2d 1244
(Ill. App. CL 1983)).
322. Regal Package Liquor, 446 N.E_2d at 412.
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Laight Street Corporation.323 That case, decided under a statute
impliedly but not expressly validating interim acts, 324 held that,
as a matter of law, revocation of a lessee corporation's dissolution
would validate its exercise of an option during the period of its
dissolution if the exercise of the option were otherwise proper.3
Narrowly read, the Bowditch case held that, under New York law
permitting a dissolved corporation to sue and defend suits in its
own name and to collect aid distribute its assets for "winding up"
purposes, the corporation would be entitled to exercise the option
if that were its only remaining valuable asset.326 However, the
court also went out of its way to liberally interpret the revivor
statute to provide for retroactive validation, adding:
Even if this court were to accept plaintiff's argument that
the exercise of the option had been prohibited new business
for a dissolved corporation, we find that the 1980
reinstatement of the corporation annulled the dissolution
and gave the corporation back all of its powers, nunc pro
tunc. By statute, "the corporate powers, rights, duties and
obligations" were reinstated nunc pro tunc, as if "such
proclamation had not been made or published." [Tax Law
203-A[7][8].] Under this view, defendant's exercise of its
option or renewal rights in 1979 remains a valid use of
corporate powers. Moreover, such retroactive validation is
not inconsistent with the purpose of the statute. Tax Law
203-A is designed to encourage payment of delinquent taxes
even as it permits corporations dissolved on account of
delinquency to wind up their affairs.
An additional rationale exists for crediting defendant
corporation with power to exercise the option. New York
recognizes that a corporation which carries on its affairs
and exercises corporate powers as before dissolution is a de
323. 443 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1981).
324. See supra note 300 (discussing applicable New York statutes).
325. Bowditch, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89.
326. Id. at 788.
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facto corporation, as well, and, ordinarily, no one but the
state may question its corporate existence.327
In all the important states discussed above, broad retroactive
validation of interim acts is the rule. The California Legislature
desperately needs to recognize the importance of retroactive
validation and take action to become part of the salutary trend,
thereby removing the uncertainty which currently plagues revived
corporations in California.
In the final analysis of out-of-state authorities, (1) those dealing
with situations roughly factually similar to this Article's
hypotheticals, (2) those decided under statutes similar to
California's, and (3) those in "important" states all show trends
toward a broad, logical rule of retroactive validation of interim
corporate acts upon a corporation's revivor. 32 California's courts
and Legislature should follow the teachings of its sister states and
explicitly affirm California's adherence to a rule of comprehensive
retroactive validation of all interim acts upon revivor.
III. LOGICAL FLAWS IN CALFORNIA LAW, AND SUGGESTED
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REFORM
A. Review of Logical Flaws
The "procedural/substantive" act distinction which California
courts presently use to determine which interim acts are validated
by revivor 9 has no logical basis and is difficult to apply. This
is aptly illustrated by examining it in the context of the statute of
limitations exception to retroactive validation.33  As one
327. IL at 788 (citations omitted).
328. See supra notes 182-323 and accompanying text (presenting out-of-state authority).
329. See supra notes 134-47 and accompanying text (discussing the "proceduralfsubstantive'"
analysis).
330. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
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California court of appeal astutely remarked (while noting that an
appeal taken by a suspended corporation may be validated by
revivor after the time to appeal has run), "we question why the
timely filing of a notice of appeal, which is jurisdictional and
cannot be waived, is a procedural action unaffected by a
corporation's suspension, while the statute of limitations, which is
not jurisdictional and can be waived, is a substantive defense fatal
to a suspended corporation's cause of action. However, we leave
the resolution of this apparent inconsistency to the Supreme
Court. ' 331 The inconsistency noted above by the court of appeal
in ABA Recovery Services, Inc. v. Konold is real, not apparent, and
the differing results cannot be logically reconciled or explained.
Certainly unconvincing and specious rationales may be offered
by creative advocates (whose clients' interests are served by the
status quo) to distinguish the situations. It might be said that an
appeal is merely a "procedural" step in the life of an existing
lawsuit, whereas the statute of limitations in theory bars the very
birth of the right to bring a lawsuit, if not waived, and is thus a
"substantive" defense. Further, statutes of limitations are favored
in the law, they vest rights of repose in particular defendants to be
free of stale claims, and protect litigants and courts from lost
evidence, missing witniesses and faded memories.332 Statutory or
court-created appeal periods, on the other hand, are designed
primarily to benefit judicial administration and promote the finality
of judgments. The non-waiveability of the appeal period limit
might even be argued as supporting the analysis that it is not a
"right" or "defense" accruing to a particular person within the
meaning of California Revenue and Taxation section 23305, as is
331. ABA Recovery Serv., Inc. v. Konold, 198 Cal. App. 3d 720,725 n.2, 255 Cal. Rptr. 27,
30 n.2 (1988) (emphasis added) (commenting on the result in Rooney v. Vermont Inv. Corp., 10 Cal.
3d 351,515 P.2d 297, 110 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1973)). It is interesting that the Konold court's plea was
to the supreme court, rather than the legislature. Perhaps it was evident from the Konold court's
review of the cases that the supreme court's failure to expressly disapprove the old statute of
limitations cases, beginning with Cleveland v. Gore Bros., Inc., 14 Cal. App. 2d 681, 58 P.2d 931
(1936), is responsible for this glaring logical flaw in the present case law, but it did not further
elaborate.
332. See 3 B.E. Wmru CALiORA PRocEnuR § 309, at 338 (3d. ed. 1985) (discussing
purposes underlying statutes of limitation).
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a statute of limitations. Further, as supported by the somewhat
more apt plea in abatement/plea in bar distinction, the late filing of
an appeal says nothing about the merits or justice of a cause,
whereas the filing of an action outside the limitations period may
indicate that it is conclusively presumed stale and be a complete
defense on the merits.
Ultimately, however, such attempted distinctions lack logical
merit, and are without any real difference. A duly served complaint
places defendants on notice of the claims against them, and fully
satisfies all purposes of the statute of limitations whether or not the
corporate plaintiff has paid its taxes. The defendant is indeed a
"stranger to the dealings" between the plaintiff and the state, and
those tax dealings obviously have nothing to do with the merits of
the lawsuit against the defendant. As aptly noted by a fairly recent
depublished opinion in a related, but not totally analogous, context:
[W]hile the statute of limitations is considered a meritorious
defense, its underlying purpose is not further by cutting off
an action filed within the statutory period by a foreign
corporation later determined to have conducted intrastate
business so as to need to qualify under [Corporations Code]
section 2105. Such a case is not one in which a claim has
been 'allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared'...
Nor is this a case where the adversary has not been put on
notice of the claim within the applicable period of
limitation and has gained the right to be free of stale
claims.33
3
333. American Retail Management, Inc. v. Bakersfield Food City, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 1312,
1326, 247 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1988), rehg denied and ordered depub'd Aug. 25, 1988 (depublished
opinion affirming trial court's denial of defendants' post-trial motion to amend their answer to assert
the statute of limitations against the plaintiff foreign corporation which had not qualified to do
business in California; court held statute was tolled by corporation's filing of complaint and
distinguished corporate suspension statutes barring corporation from bringing suit from the narrower
disability scheme at California Corporations Code section 2203(e), which expressly contemplates
foreign corporations necessity for them to qualify). Unfortunately, this case's depublished status
makes it unciteable by corporate practitioners in their legal briefs and memoranda. See CAL. R. Cr.
977.
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As indicated by the supreme court in Peacock Hill, once a
corporation has paid its taxes, little purpose would be served by
imposing an additional penalty of dismissal.334 If the nonpayment
was inadvertent, further penalties would not likely serve any
deterrent purpose. With the exception of the statutory right to void
uncured interim contracts, any "defenses" constituting exceptions
to the retroactive validation rule are merely results of unfortunate
doctrinal unclarity. As demonstrated above, this unsatisfactory
doctrine results from a judicial reluctance to overrule existing
precedents, though those precedents are based in part on a mistaken
view of the intended effect of the suspension and revivor statutes,
and even though the recognized policy underlying the suspension
statutes has been completely transformed since those decisions.3 '
In addition to the logical inconsistencies resulting from the
California Supreme Court's failure to overrule the doctrine of
Ransome-Crummey,336 the unfortunate (and apparently accidental)
development of the "substantive/procedural" distinction seems
destined to produce arbitrary and unfair results. This distinction has
proved unworkable in the legal contexts of (1) applicable rules of
decision in federal diversity cases as reflected by Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins 37 and its progeny, and (2) the field of conflict of
laws, in which a forum state's "procedural" laws are generally
deemed applicable.3 It would seem naive to believe that this
334. Peacock Hill Assn v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369, 371, 503 P.2d 285,
286, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 30 (1972).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 45-101.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 50-75 (discussing the Ransome-Crummey doctrine).
337. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
338. While this is the general rule, see, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 862-66, 264
P.2d 944, 946-49 (1953), California has, of course, adopted the "governmental interest" approach
to choice-of-law problems. See generally Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 31 (1967). Although arguments can be made that the traditional substance/procedure distinction
mandating application of the forum's "procedural" limitations was not abandoned by this adoption,
the weight of recent authority and scholarship in this volatile field of law now holds that interest
analysis applies with equal force to statutes of limitation. See Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc.,
816 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1987) (diversity action applying California choice-of-law rules under mandate
of Klaxon Co. v. Stenor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941), and thus applying California
"governmental interest" approach with its "comparative impairment" component to resolve a "true
conflict' " of laws by applying Arizona's longer statutes of limitation rather than California's); but see
Ledesma v. Jack Stewart Produce, Inc., 816 F.2d 482,486-87 (9th Cir. 1987) (Noonan, J., dissenting)
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unreliable standard could prove helpful in the confused area of
California corporate suspension and revivor law.339
B. Suggestions For Legislative and Judicial Reform
It is desirable for the Legislature to act as soon as reasonably
possible to provide a measure of certainty to this area. If the
Legislature agrees with Peacock Hill and the trend of out-of-state
authorities,3" that the purpose of the suspension and revivor
statutes is to prompt the payment of taxes, not to punish revived
corporations which have paid with penalties, the Legislature should
clearly specify exactly which, if any, "actions, defenses or rights"
accruing to third parties by reason of the suspension it wishes to
preserve. If the Legislature believes, as does Justice Mosk, 341 that
the purpose of a tax suspension is punitive and that Ransome-
(suggesting adoption of the governmental interest analysis does not mandate abandonment of
traditional substance/procedural distinction); see also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1432
(C.D. Cal. 1985) (traditional conflicts rule employing procedurallsubstantive distinction "widely
followed" in California, but uncertainty created by recent case of Ashland Chemical Co. v. Provence,
129 Cal. App. 3d 790, 181 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1982) compelled court to apply both tests). See generally
Gary L. Milhollin, Interest Analysis and Conflicts Between Statues of Limitation, 27 HASTINGS L.
1 (1975) (arguing traditional substance/procedure distinction is fundamentally irreconcilable with
interest analysis, but noting that forum's paramount interest in its own administration and judicial
economy, and weight of scholarly opinion, nevertheless favor a general conflicts rule requiring
application of the forum's period of limitation if it is shorter than the competing state's).
339. Even if unwilling to expressly overrule Ransome-Crummey and its progeny, the California
Supreme Court might more emphatically (and with success) embrace the more descriptive "plea in
bar/plea in abatement" distinction drawn in the better reasoned and somewhat older Court of Appeal
authorities. A plea in abatement is one "'which, without disputing [the] justice of plaintiff's claim,
objects to place, mode or time of asserting it, [thus allowing] plaintiff to renew suit in another place
or forum or at another time, and does not assume to answer [the] action on its merits, or deny [the]
existence of [a] particular cause of action." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1037 (5th ed. 1979). A plea
in bar, such as the statue of limitations, "goes to bar the plaintiff's action; that is, to defeat it
absolutely and entirely." 1d The best solution for the supreme court and the corporate practitioner
would, of course, be a legislative enactment explicitly effecting complete retroactive validation of all
of a corporation's interim acts upon revivor, or a uniform judicial adoption of plea in abatement
analysis as to all claimed defects resulting from suspension.
340. See supra text accompanying notes 91-101, 182-327 (discussing the Peacock Hill case and
other out-of-state cases which have considered the purposes underlying suspension and revivor
statutes).
341. Peacock Hill Ass'n v. Peacock Lagoon Constr. Co., 8 Cal. 3d 369,374-74, 503 P.2d 285,
288-90, 105 Cal. Rptr. 29, 32-34 (1972) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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Crummey? 2 should thus retain vitality, it should then clearly
specify which acts undertaken by a suspended corporation are void
and incapable of retroactive validation through revivor and which
are not.
As evidenced by this Article's delineation of the problems
created by California's present approach, and its examination of the
trends of out-of-state authorities," the author believes the
Legislature should opt for the first approach.3" Such a statute,
which would have the salutary effect of reducing arbitrary risk and
encouraging in-state corporate investment and activity, could be
modeled after the pertinent language in the statutes of Delaware,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, or Pennsylvania, discussed
above,345 or even after the "restoration" provision of California
Revenue and Taxation Code section 23305c, which presently
applies only to mistakenly suspended corporations.346 The goal is
simple: Revivor should place the corporation in exactly the same
position as if suspension had never occurred. Rather than receiving
undeserved windfalls from pointless and wasteful litigation, parties
pointing out a corporation's suspension would simply be acting as
good citizens, reporting (and, no doubt, initiating a rapid cure of)
a corporation's tax delinquencies. Any rewards that they gain for
so doing should be specified by the tax code, not left to the chance
and caprice of business dealings.
Alternatively, if the Legislature does not act, the courts should,
by jettisoning the doctrine of Ransome-Crummey, as well as the
equally unhelpful "substance/procedure" and "plea in abatement"
analyses. Rather than focusing on analogies involving "corpses"
342. Ransome-Crummey Co. v. Superior Court, 188 Cal. 393, 205 P. 446 (1922).
343. See supra text accompanying notes 177-327.
344. The Legislature could adopt a middle ground, punishing purposefully delinquent
corporations by rendering their acts void, while allowing inadvertently delinquent corporations the
ability to retroactively validate most or all of their interim acts through revivor. However, such a
middle approach would still have the disadvantage of injecting a mini-trial on a largely extraneous
and difficult to prove factual issue into any proceeding in which a once tax-delinquent corporation
is involved. It seems wise, therefore, and much more practical, to have a uniform, readily understood
rule about retroactive validation which affects all tax delinquent corporations in the same fashion and
validates without exception all interim acts of a revived corporation.
345. See supra notes 292, 294-96, 298 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 7.
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or "unconscious persons," the capacity of a corporation to invoke
jurisdiction, or the elusive distinction between "substantive" rights
and "procedural" acts, the courts should go back to Rossi v. Caire
and recognize the "without prejudice" proviso simply as a savings
clause intended to ensure retroactive validation of all interim acts,
except as otherwise specifically provided by statute. 7 Suspended
corporations will be estopped or legally barred from asserting the
validity or claiming the benefit of acts undertaken during
suspension, but the estoppel or bar will be annulled, or lifted, upon
revival nunc pro tunc, just as if it had never existed.
V. CONCLUSION
Scant statutory guidance in California has spawned an
unworkable, illogical and confusing body of case law on the
subject of the validity of interim corporate acts following revivor.
The present law, in addition to unwisely following outmoded
precedents decided under invalid rationales and outdated policies,
and employing an unworkable "substantive/procedural" distinction,
at best leaves an unsatisfactory void outside the litigation and
contract contexts in which virtually every interim act of a
suspended corporation is ripe for challenge by litigious opponents.
This "void in the corporate existence" can be fatal to a
corporation's important interim acts and is an undesirable catalyst
to wasteful court-clogging litigation as well.
The apparent trend in California, as expressed by its highest
court, however, as well as the manifested trend in the relevant
statutes and case law of other important states and states with
similar statutes, is to hold that revivor works a broad retroactive
validation of all interim acts (except contracts, which are often
subject to special rules) once a delinquent corporation has paid its
overdue taxes with all penalties and interest.
347. 186 Cal. 544, 199 P. 1042 (1921); see supra notes 41-44,59-72 and accompanying text
(discussing Rossi's view of the "without prejudice" proviso as a savings clause intended to preserve
the validity of interim acts).
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In order to clarify that California is indeed part of this desirable
trend (which would reduce needless litigation in California's
already overburdened courts, promote business, and aid more
efficient, inexpensive and productive corporate planning) and to
remedy the defects presently inhering in the poorly reasoned case
law, California's Legislature should amend the relevant statutes.
The amended statutes should provide that all interim acts are
validated by revivor just as if no suspension had ever occurred.
Under such an amendment, each interim act and right discussed in
the hypotheticals in the Article's first part (i.e. the mining claim
labor, the intellectual property rights, the broker's license renewals,
and the land use permits and approvals) would clearly be valid.348
At the very least, the Legislature should specify precisely which,
if any, interim corporate acts are void and incapable of validation
by revivor.349 Alternatively, if the Legislature does not act, the
supreme court should act decisively at the first opportunity to
clarify that all interim acts are retroactively validated by revivor,
except as specifically provided by statute.
Only when appropriate and explicit statutory guidance (or
decisive and logically coherent judicial clarification) is brought to
this muddled area of law will a fair and noncapricious approach to
the effects of temporary corporate suspension prevail. Until that
time, excessive and frivolous litigation over collateral matters
between the state and taxpayer litigants will continue to proliferate.
348. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
349. This would, for example, force the Legislature to either explicitly adopt or reject the ill-
reasoned rule that complaints cannot be retroactively validated when a corporate plaintiff is revived
after the running of the statute of limitations.
